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BASING BUDGET BASELINES
DAVID KAMIN*
ABSTRACT
Measuring the cost of legislation or even projecting the course of
the federal budget requires defining a budget baseline—a starting
point capturing the current state of the budget. Budget baselines
underlie most measures employed in federal budget debates and
enforcement rules. Yet, despite their widespread use, budget base-
lines engender considerable confusion and abuse.
For instance, when legislators enact temporary tax breaks, the
breaks are officially estimated to cost far less than they likely will
because of a loophole in federal budget baseline rules. Then, later
efforts to extend the tax cuts are counted as increasing deficits when,
in fact, by more reasonable metrics, they do nothing of the sort and
might even reduce deficits.
In response to such problems and the relative lack of scholarly
attention, this Article seeks to ground budget baselines in a theoreti-
cal framework and then apply this framework to some of the leading
debates involving baselines. For example, after presenting this new
framework for understanding budget baselines, the Article proposes
a way to fix the official baseline so that temporary tax cuts no longer
appear less expensive than they really are and extensions no longer
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appear more expensive. This Article also uses this framework to
describe why the long-term fiscal shortfall is smaller than often de-
picted and why a long-term budget metric now under consideration
should be rejected.
By arriving at a better understanding of budget baselines, this
Article helps to inform a number of key fiscal debates and makes re-
commendations for how to improve budget measures going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
It was the end of 2012, and Washington was embroiled in a fiscal
standoff. Hundreds of billions per year in tax cuts (collectively
known as the “2001 and 2003 tax cuts”) were scheduled to expire.1
Republicans wanted almost all of them extended,2 but Democrats
demanded that the high-income tax cuts be pared back.3 The econ-
omy was on the line, as projections showed that failing to resolve
the standoff and allowing all the tax cuts to expire at once could end
the nascent recovery and drive the country back into recession.4
This “fiscal cliff” drew plenty of headlines,5 but one relatively
little-noted aspect of the cliff is that it had largely resulted from a
quirk in what is known as a budget baseline. Furthermore, its reso-
lution would be subject to the same quirk, making a final deal best
seen as a tax increase appear as a very large tax cut, at least in the
official cost estimates.
To quote from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, a baseline is “a
starting point.”6 Or, to offer a somewhat more technical variation
1. Policy Basics: The 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-the-2001-and-2003-tax-cuts [http://
perma.cc/Z4PN-BFDG].
2. For instance, as an opening offer, the House Republicans passed the Job Protection
and Recession Prevention Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, Aug. 1,
2012). The bill continued almost all the expiring tax cuts for another year (although it did
leave out some newly enacted expansions of refundable tax credits that benefited low income
Americans). Id.
3. President Obama’s administration proposed eliminating about 30 percent of the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts. See infra note 67.
4. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE [CBO], ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REDUCING THE FISCAL
RESTRAINT THAT IS SCHEDULED TO OCCUR IN 2013, at 6 tbl.2 (2012) [hereinafter CBO,
ECONOMIC EFFECTS 2013] (showing the economy shrinking in the first half of 2013 if the
country went over the fiscal cliff, including both the effects of the expiring tax cuts and the
sequester on the spending side). 
5. The fiscal cliff broke through to mass culture sufficiently enough that “The Simpsons”
posted a short segment in which Mr. Burns explains the fiscal cliff. Animation Domination,
The Simpsons: Fiscal Cliff, YOUTUBE (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c91us
T4P1u0 [http://perma.cc/ER8J-Z4QK].
6. Baseline Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
baseline [http://perma.cc/B4QG-89NK] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). This is actually the fifth
definition offered by Merriam-Webster. The first three are not directly relevant to this Arti-
cle (though an article about the tennis baseline might be of interest to a broader audience).
The fourth definition is a possible alternative. It defines baseline as “a usually initial set of
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on that—and applying it to a legal system—the baseline is the
starting point of the legal regime and the reference point against
which to measure legal change. The budget baseline is a subset of
this: it is the starting point of the legal regime with budgetary ef-
fect. Anytime someone cites the cost of new legislation or describes
how much a policymaker is increasing (or decreasing) spending, a
baseline is at play—since any change must be measured relative to
a starting point: the baseline.
The official budget baseline was a central character in the story
of the fiscal cliff. Specifically, the official baseline treats expiration
of temporary tax cuts as “real,” even as it assumes extension of a
number of major spending programs that also regularly expire.7
The original authors of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts took advantage
of this loophole and wrote in an expiration to reduce the cost of the
tax cut package and avoid budget enforcement rules that could
have otherwise made enactment much more difficult.8 Further, the
same rule would govern in resolving the fiscal cliff. Despite the
Democrats winning what some called a tax increase on the highest-
income Americans, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) esti-
mated that the final deal added nearly $4 trillion to the deficit over
the coming decade by making most of the tax cuts permanent.9
 As this illustrates, when it comes to temporary tax changes, the
baseline used to judge our current course and changes from it is
broken. In this Article, I propose a way to amend the official
baseline to close this loophole—which both parties continue to
abuse—going forward.10
At the very same time that baseline manipulation was playing a
large (albeit underappreciated) role in the fiscal cliff mess, it also
featured in another fiscal debate dividing Washington: the long-
term course of the federal budget. Back in 2012, CBO emphasized
critical observations or data used for comparison or a control.” Id. However, as I employ the
term baseline, it is not simply a random point of comparison but, in some meaningful sense,
the starting point against which to compare legal change.
7. For a description of the baseline rules, see infra note 158 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text for a description of how expiration, in
combination with the baseline rules, eased passage of the tax cuts. 
9. See CBO, COST: ESTIMATE OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 8, THE AMERICAN
TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012 (2013).
10. See infra Part IV.C.
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a long-term scenario—essentially, a baseline capturing our current
course—that showed the budget on a track toward fiscal calamity.11
CBO projected debt in excess of 250 percent of GDP by the 2040s.12
These types of projections set the stage for the deficit-reduction
recommendations from entities like the Bowles-Simpson fiscal com-
mission, and helped justify the fiscal austerity that began in 2010.13
However, this long-term baseline and others like it were fundamen-
tally flawed and represented not so much a devastating long-term
outlook as a fundamental confusion over that outlook—a point this
author made at the time.14
And just one year later in its 2013 report, CBO highlighted a
much rosier fiscal future.15 In this new projection, debt stood at
around 100 percent of GDP by 204016—not low, but much better
than the projection from the year before and probably not deserving
of the “fiscal crisis” label. In large part, this radical turnaround
reflected different assumptions about the course of future law, but
not anything that policymakers had done in the meantime.17
11. CBO, THE 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 2 (2012) [hereinafter CBO, 2012 LONG-
TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK].
12. See id. In fact, this scenario was prominently shown on the cover of the report (along
with the “extended baseline scenario”). Id. at 1.
13. See Ed O’Keefe, What Is the Simpson-Bowles Commission? (and Why Does it Still
Matter?), WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/
2012/11/27/what-is-the-simpson-bowles-commission-and-why-does-it-still-matter/ [http://
perma.cc/6CR4-Q9JK].
14. David Kamin, Are We There Yet?: On a Path to Closing America’s Long-Run Deficit,
137 TAX NOTES 53, 59-60 (2012).
15. See CBO, THE 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 2 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, 2013
LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK]. To be clear, the 2013 report also included the same dire
“alternative fiscal scenario” as the 2012 report. See id. at 4. It was, however, explicitly
deemphasized. See, e.g., id. at 64 (describing how in its revenue projections the new report
focused primarily on the “extended baseline” rather than the “alternative fiscal scenario”). 
16. Id.
17. While CBO explains that its move to deemphasize the alternative fiscal scenario
resulted from congressional action, this in fact does not account for most of the difference in
the projections. In particular, Congress did make permanent most of the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts between the 2012 and 2013 projections. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, H.R.
8, 112th Cong. §§ 101-102. According to CBO, Congress’s action meant that CBO no longer
had to rely on its “alternative fiscal scenario” to paint a realistic picture of the federal
budget’s future course, or at least that was the implication. See CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM
BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 64. The problem with this explanation is that the pro-
jection CBO emphasizes in its 2013 report hugely differs from its 2012 alternative fiscal scen-
ario. Very little of this difference can be explained by congressional action on the tax cuts.
The 2012 alternative fiscal scenario had assumed extension of all the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.
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The radical change in the long-term trajectory has received less
notice than it deserves; this reflects the more fundamental problem
that many baselines—and perhaps long-term baselines espe-
cially—rely on unexamined assumptions. The inconsistency derives
from confusion, even among the official budget agencies, as to what
long-term baselines should measure. This Article offers a theory to
ground long-term baselines by better describing what they can and
should measure, and rejects a long-term metric advocated by
some—called generational accounting—that represents an inco-
herent approach to long-term budgeting and reflects a further
misunderstanding of baselines.
In sum, confusion around and abuse of budget baselines have
shaped some of the most important fiscal policies of the current
century, and failures in budget baselines have undermined political
accountability, budget enforcement rules, and a proper understand-
ing of the likely effects of these budget policies. In this Article, I
seek to remedy this confusion and abuse.
I start by laying out a historical and theoretical groundwork in
Parts I and II. Part I describes the origins of budget baselines in the
1970s and their subsequent widespread use in federal budgeting.
Part II then engages in theoretical work that so far has been largely
neglected by the literature, identifying how budget baselines can be
constructively used in decision making. This is in contrast to some
recent scholarship that sees baselines as largely arbitrary18 and
servicing irrational biases.19
See CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, at 18. Congress had, in fact,
made 80 percent of them permanent. Chye-Ching Huang, Budget Deal Makes Permanent 82
Percent of President Bush’s Tax Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-3-13tax.pdf [http://perma.cc/CA26-MYKA]. That was the main
legislative development. The huge swing in the projections is instead largely explained by
assumptions about growth in revenues and discretionary spending after the end of the
decade—changes that cannot be reasonably explained by legislative developments in the
ensuing year. See infra Part IV.D.1.
18. See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH
TOWARD BANKRUPTCY 159 (2007) (“The choice of a baseline is inevitably arbitrary, or at least
subject to differing interpretations.”).
19. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain & Nicole Verrier Crain, Fiscal Consequences of Budget
Baselines, 67 J. PUB. ECON. 421, 423-24 (1998) (explaining that baselines matter because of
the “loss aversion” bias); see also David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing
the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 758-60 (2010) (arguing that these
irrational mechanisms are one of the key ways that baselines affect decision making).
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Part III then brings organization to the jumble of employable
baselines by creating a taxonomy of different budget baselines—
differentiated by the part of the legal system these baselines hold
constant going forward—and recommending which baselines to use
and when. I argue that priority should be given to the expectations
baseline—reflecting what is actually expected to occur. To give two
examples: we should generally expect temporary tax cuts to be
continued, and the baselines we use should reflect that expectation.
Similarly, we should expect that the unsustainable will not be
sustained in fiscal policy and that, one way or another, the budget
deficits will be controlled in the coming years. Consequently, some
of the predictions of fiscal calamity for future generations are
overstated and certainly improperly framed.
With this taxonomy established, Part IV of this Article then
applies these conclusions regarding which baselines to use to four
separate ongoing debates that prominently feature baselines. First,
I engage the longstanding debate over whether we should use
baselines at all; I answer this “yes” in light of the considerable
information that would be lost in the absence of baselines. Second,
I describe why spending in the baseline should grow in nominal
terms, despite calls (especially from conservatives) for a nominal
freeze. Specifically, I conclude that a nominal freeze is not consis-
tent with any of the constructive purposes of budget baselines, and
serves only to misinform decision makers (if anything). Third, I
engage how baselines (and cost estimates) should deal with tem-
porary legislation, arguing that expirations should frequently be
ignored. Finally, I discuss our long-term fiscal future and detail how
baseline confusion is leading to a significant exaggeration of the
magnitude and nature of the long-term fiscal shortfall, and should
lead us to reject new methods like generational accounting that
some are pushing to be officially adopted.
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I. HISTORY OF BUDGET BASELINES
A. The Advent of the Federal Budget Baseline
The modern system of federal baseline budgeting began to take
root in 1974 with the passage of the Congressional Budget Act.20
That Act, which established the framework for the current budget
process, included two separate provisions key to the development
of budget baselines. First, it required the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) annually to submit to Congress an estimate of the
amount of funding needed in the upcoming year to maintain federal
programs at “the same level as the fiscal year in progess and with-
out policy changes”21—a baseline often referred to as a “current ser-
vices” or “current policy” baseline. Second, the Act created CBO as
a competing counterpart to the executive budget office22 and, among
other things, asked CBO to produce each year a projection of the
budget over the five years to come.23
Before 1974, federal budget analysts and policymakers used a
baseline—but it was a very simple one, at least when it came to
spending programs. In particular, spending levels were often com-
pared to the nominal level (unadjusted for inflation or any other
factors) of the prior year.24 This was referred to as the “base” rather
20. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297. For another history of budget baselines (up until the mid-1990s), see Timothy J.
Muris, The Uses and Abuses of Budget Baselines, in THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING
FEDERAL SPENDING 42 (John F. Cogan et al. eds., 1994). That history provides an especially
good overview of the early development of the “current services” baseline, including
legislative history and disagreements on methodology. Id. Muris is a strong critic of baselines
as currently employed, and I address and summarize a number of his arguments. See infra
Part IV.B.
21. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 605. The idea for requiring
a current services baseline was first proposed by Senator Ed Muskie, reflecting back on his
time as governor of Maine where they used such a baseline to evaluate program changes.
THE BUDGET PUZZLE, supra note 20, at 125.
22. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 201.
23. Id. § 308(c).
24. See CBO, STATEMENT OF ALICE M. RIVLIN BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
1 (Dec. 3, 1975) (“The baseline that most often has been used is last year’s budget level.”); see
also Muris, supra note 20, at 42 (“Throughout most of U.S. history, the base used to compare
alternative budget proposals was either the levels in the previous year’s budget or those
proposed by the President.”).
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than a “baseline,”25 but the point remains the same. Policymakers
and analysts used these figures as the starting point for budgeting
for the upcoming fiscal year.
For revenues, the baseline was more sophisticated even in these
early years. At least a few presidents’ budgets prior to the Congres-
sional Budget Act compared the proposed revenue level to what
would occur under “current law” while taking into account changes
in the economy.26 This is akin to the current approach for calculat-
ing baseline revenues.
The early use of the current-year nominal figures as a baseline
naturally precluded long-term budget projections. As will be dis-
cussed further in Part IV.B, the previous year’s nominal funding is
of questionable relevance as a “starting point,” even for the upcom-
ing year. Conditions—such as inflation, economic growth, and
changes in caseload—mean that $100 in the current year for a
program simply is not the same thing as $100 in the next year.
Over longer periods of time, this becomes even more true. Looking
only at what occurred in the previous year makes it difficult—or
impossible—to project what will occur years down the road.
Thus, the advent of the new baseline helped policymakers and
budget analysts begin to look beyond the ends of their noses, and
beyond just the previous year’s funding level. Alice Rivlin, the first
director of CBO, made this point in some of her early testimony
before Congress responding to OMB’s current services projection.27
In tasking CBO with making a five-year budget projection, Con-
gress, at the time, had not actually given direction as to how that
projection should be made. Rivlin made clear that CBO would use
a “current services” concept to project spending in its new five-year
projections (as it then proceeded to do)28 and she ended her
testimony with a strong endorsement of the new baseline. As Rivlin
declared, “I believe that the use of such estimates will become wide-
25. Muris, supra note 20, at 42.
26. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET [OMB], EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1970, at 61 (1969) (identifying
the effects of legislated and proposed changes in tax rates on receipts, separate from the
effects of such factors as economic growth if current law were kept in place).
27. See CBO, supra note 24, at 1-4 (describing why a previous year’s funding level is not
relevant for analyzing many programs’ future funding levels).
28. Id. at 12.
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spread, both in the Congress and in the Executive Branch.”29 She
was right.
B. Baseline Disagreement and (Some) Consensus
In the early days of the “current services” baseline, there was
uncertainty as to how to implement the new baseline, and both
budget offices used a variety of assumptions.30 These inconsisten-
cies were temporarily alleviated when two laws—the first in 1985
and the second in 1990 amending the first—established a baseline
for purposes of certain budget enforcement rules.31 The assumptions
29. Id. at 13.
30. Cogan and co-authors describe how three different concepts were seen as potentially
consistent with the broad language of the 1974 Act, which required programs to be held at
“the same level as the current year without a change in policy.” See THE BUDGET PUZZLE,
supra note 20, at 125-26 (citation omitted). One concept was something close to a true
“current services.” Id. at 126. For all federal programs, this meant adjusting for inflation
based on individual programmatic needs. Id. In addition, phase-ins and expirations—both
with regard to taxes and spending—were excluded, so that law was continued consistent with
the current year, regardless of what was written on the books. Id. at 128. A second concept
was “current policy.” Id. at 126. Under this concept, a uniform inflation adjustment was used
for all “discretionary” programs—those which were annually appropriated—irrespective of
individual programmatic needs. Id. For mandatory programs (like Social Security), the
adjustment was made based on past program performance. Id. Phase-ins and expirations
were assumed to occur as actually scheduled. Id. at 128. Finally, under a “current law”
concept, no inflation adjustment was used at all for projecting discretionary programs, and
revenues and mandatory programs followed what was actually on the books. Id.
Although it is possible to take issue with some of this typology as laid out by Cogan and
his co-authors, there was undeniably considerable conceptual confusion as to exactly how to
implement the baseline under the 1974 Act. Many of the initial projections from CBO and
OMB mixed and matched these concepts, and neither budget office was completely consistent
over time. For an example of such inconsistency with CBO, compare CBO, FIVE-YEAR BUDGET
PROJECTIONS: FISCAL YEARS 1977-81, at 2-3 (1976) (assuming that discretionary appro-
priations continue and are increased with inflation over time in the baseline projection), with
CBO, FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS: FISCAL YEARS 1981-1985, at 24-25 (1980) (focusing
on a “current law” projection in which discretionary programs are assumed to continue at a
nominal freeze, and providing a scenario with inflation adjustments as an alternative). For
an example of such inconsistency with OMB, compare OMB, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1980, at 14 (1979) (not adjusting all programs for
inflation in the current services projections), with OMB, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 3-4 (1980) (apparently adjusting all programs for the
effects of inflation—or what is here called “rising program costs”—in the current services
projection).
31. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§ 251(a)(6), 99 Stat. 1037, 1067-68 (setting out the assumptions to be used in calculating the
“budget base”); Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 257, 104 Stat. 1388-
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set out in those baselines were then largely adopted in CBO and
OMB budget projections.32 That baseline continues to be referenced
today, even if not always followed.33 I refer to the variation now
employed by CBO as the “official” baseline. As amended in 1990,
the baseline dictated uniform inflation measures to be used for
projecting annually appropriated budget authority.34 It established
exactly how mandatory programs were to be projected: follow cur-
rent law—that is, the law on the books going forward—except for
any temporary mandatory programs greater than $50 million per
year, which were assumed to be made permanent.35 It also gave the
591 (establishing the baseline and setting out the assumptions to be used). In these two laws,
Congress established the baseline (or, as the 1985 law called it, the “budget base”) to help
facilitate the new budget enforcement rules. The first law set out deficit targets to be adhered
to. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act § 251(a)(6). The second—over-
riding the first—established a new “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rule that required any new tax
cuts or mandatory spending increases to be fully paid for. See Budget Enforecement Act
§ 257. Enforcing these rules required a baseline for two reasons. First, a baseline was needed
to determine whether the budget rules had been breached, as the first rule required
projecting deficits for the upcoming fiscal year and the second required measuring the
magnitude of tax cuts or mandatory spending increases relative to a baseline. Second, a
violation of the rules would trigger a sequester (automatic spending cuts on eligible
programs), and a baseline was needed to determine what share of the cuts would fall on a
given program.
32. See, e.g., CBO, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1992-1996, at
60-62 (1991) (describing how CBO conformed its baseline to that adopted in the 1990 law,
with the exception that it would show discretionary levels adjusted for inflation, as under
that law, and assume the recently enacted discretionary caps were followed); OMB, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 13 app. two (1992) (describing
the assumptions underlying OMB’s “current services” baseline, which generally adhered to
the baseline described in the 1990 law with the exception of discretionary funding levels that
were assumed to follow the discretionary caps).
33. See, e.g., OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 381 (2014) [hereinafter OMB,
FISCAL YEAR 2015] (describing how, throughout the 1990s, the baseline was calculated
according to the rules set out in the Budget Enforcement Act, and detailing adjustments to
that baseline that OMB now employs in projecting current services).
34. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 § 257.
35. Id. This rule changed in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. See Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10209(a)(1)(A)(i), 111 Stat. 251, 710. The Act gave discretion
to the budget committees and OMB to decide how to treat temporary programs in the
baseline with annual spending of over $50 million per year, and tasked the institutions with
consulting each other. Id. The rule they agreed to is to assume that these programs actually
expire if they are explicitly stated to be temporary; otherwise, such programs are assumed
to continue in the baseline. For programs enacted before 1997, the original rule (assuming
extension) continues to apply. See OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 33, at 382 n.2
(explaining treatment of temporary mandatory programs enacted after 1997).
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projection rule for receipts: follow current law except for temporary
excise taxes devoted to trust funds, which were assumed to also be
made permanent.36 Further, in the 1990s, CBO expanded its medi-
um-term projection window from five years to ten years.37 OMB
followed suit, although the length of OMB’s budget window has
fluctuated since then.38
The temporary consensus around the medium-term federal bud-
get baseline entirely broke down entering the 2000s. The key turn-
ing point was the enactment of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.39 As a
way to make them both appear less expensive than they likely
would be and evade budget rules, these large tax cuts were written
into law as temporary measures, even though supporters intended
to make them permanent.40 The magnitude of these and the other
also-expiring tax cuts enacted during the Bush Administration was
large—equal to nearly 2 percent of the economy.41 Under the official
baseline rules, these tax cuts were assumed to be temporary, pro-
ducing a rosy budget outlook based on a scenario (expiration of the
36. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 § 257.
37. See CBO, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998, at 35-39
(1993) (showing budget figures projected for an additional five years beyond the then-
traditional five-year window). By 1996, CBO had completed the switch to the now-standard
ten-year budget window for its projections. See generally CBO, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 (1996) (using a ten-year budget window for all of the key
budget projections).
38. By the end of the Clinton Administration, OMB was using a ten-year budget window.
See OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 391-422 (using a ten-year window for budget projections). The Bush
Administration then switched to a five-year window in its second budget. See OMB, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003,
at 395-417 (using a five-year window). Finally, the Obama Administration switched back to
a ten-year window in its first budget. See OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010: UPDATED SUMMARY TABLES 114 (using
a ten-year window for budget projections). 
39. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752.
40. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553,
1557-58 (2003) (describing how the tax cuts were made temporary as an accounting maneuv-
er to make them appear less expensive and evade budget rules, even as supporters intended
to make them permanent). 
41. See William G. Gale, Opinion, Five Myths About the Bush Tax Cuts, WASH. POST
(Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR20100
73002671.html [http://perma.cc/7NUY-PTX4] (noting that the revenue lost because of the
Bush tax cuts equals “nearly 2 percent of GDP”).
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tax cuts) that supporters of the tax cuts never intended to occur.42
The result was a baseline disconnected from any future state of the
world that analysts or policymakers thought would actually exist.
With unrealistic assumptions underlying the official baseline, a
cottage industry quickly arose among independent budget analysts
to produce more “realistic” baselines.43 The industry included out-
side analysts working from the Brookings Institution,44 as well as
a coalition of budget-oriented Washington think tanks that, for a
time, offered a unified alternative baseline.45 These alternative
baselines quickly took on a prominent role in fiscal debates as news
reports looked to these baselines, rather than the official baseline,
for information on the budget’s future.46
The official budget offices also got into this game. By the time of
the Fiscal Year 2005 Budget, OMB was using a revised version of
the current services baseline that assumed extension of some of the
temporary tax cuts (arguably, to disguise the full cost of temporary
policies the Bush Administration had itself initiated).47 When Presi-
dent Obama took office, the new Administration adopted a series of
42. Gale & Orszag, supra note 40, at 1557 (“Policymakers supporting sunsets have every
intention of trying to make the policies permanent.”).
43. Full disclosure: I joined said cottage industry at the beginning of my career while at
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. See, e.g., DAVID KAMIN & RICHARD KOGAN, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, DEFICIT PICTURE GRIMMER THAN CBO’S MARCH PROJECTIONS
SUGGEST (2004) (detailing deficit projection based on likely policies).
44. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, The Budget Outlook: Baseline and
Adjusted Projections, 100 TAX NOTES 1595 (2003) (adjusting the CBO baseline to take into
account likely policies).
45. The coalition included the Committee for Economic Development, the Concord
Coalition, and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. See generally COMM. FOR ECON.
DEV. ET AL., MID-TERM AND LONG-TERM DEFICIT PROJECTIONS (2003).
46. See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Count on It, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/16/AR2005081601428.html [http://
perma.cc/X8Y8-ZUNW]; Edmund L. Andrews, Leap in the Deficit Instead of Fall Is Seen for
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/politics/27BUDG.html
[http://perma.cc/H97L-TGHM] (emphasizing an alternative scenario to the official baseline
in which the tax cuts are extended, among other additional costs).
47. OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2005: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 358 (2004) (describing how the Administration
adopted a current services baseline that extended the Bush tax cuts, which “were clearly not
intended to be temporary,” and criticizing the official baseline, which OMB described as
appearing identical to a current services baseline until that point, for having serious
technical flaws). For a description of how tax-cut supporters effectively manipulated the
baseline rules, see infra Part IV.C.
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different revised baselines against which to gauge the cost of its
policies—all of which assumed continuation of most, and sometimes
all, of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.48
As the official baseline projection lost policy relevance, CBO
responded. First, CBO began to regularly produce a table showing
the cost of various options (relative to the official baseline) that
allowed analysts to make their own baseline adjustments.49
Eventually, CBO began doing this itself, placing increasing
emphasis on its “alternative fiscal scenario,” which reflected
extension of the tax cuts, among other adjustments.50 To be clear,
these adjustments were not without attendant controversy. A
number of observers have suggested sticking to the official baseline
rules rather than assuming extension of temporary policy, like the
2001 and 2003 tax cuts.51
48. Sometimes, the Obama Administration assumed extension of nearly all of the Bush
tax cuts in the baseline. See, e.g., OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 375 (2009)
(describing how the Administration’s current services baselines fully extended the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts, except for estate tax repeal for which the Administration assumed extension
at the 2009 parameters). At other times, the Administration used a baseline that assumed
expiration of the “high income” tax cuts and extension of only the “middle class” Bush tax
cuts, as opposed to a baseline that assumed extension of both. See, e.g., OMB, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012:
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 420 (2011) (adopting a baseline extending only the middle class
Bush tax cuts, and notably not explaining why the baseline had shifted as compared to
earlier budgets). 
49. CBO first produced this table with its budget projections released in 2003. See CBO,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE, at 12 tbl.1-6 (2003) (showing budget
outcomes under alternative baseline assumptions like extension of the Bush tax cuts). Before
this, CBO had discussed the effects of some of these alternatives—such as extension of the
temporary tax cuts—but not in this more comprehensive fashion. See, e.g., CBO, THE BUDGET
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at 4 (2002) (showing the effects of
extending temporary tax cuts).
50. CBO started by showing a scenario in which certain policies—the most expensive of
which were the tax cuts—were continued. See CBO, PUB. NO. 4236, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2011 TO 2021, at 16 tbl.1-4 (2011) [hereinafter CBO,
FISCAL YEARS 2011 TO 2021]. CBO later began emphasizing what it called the “alternative
fiscal scenario,” which also reflected a scenario in which the tax cuts were continued. See
CBO, PUB. NO. 4474, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at
22 tbl.1-7 (2012).
51. See infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
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C. Long-Term Baselines: Confusion Always Reigns
The long-term budget baseline—extending beyond the traditional
ten-year window—perhaps generates even more confusion than the
medium-term projections. Economists like Alan Auerbach have led
the effort to increase the prominence of such projections in budget
debates, developing long-term budget metrics like the fiscal gap and
generational accounting,52 the latter of which is critiqued in Part
IV.D.2. In the mid-1990s, CBO also began calculating such long-
term projections, extending its projections decades into the future.53
Since then, CBO has annually produced a report giving its long-
term estimates of up to seventy-five years. OMB now also provides
such long-term projections under the Obama Administration’s pol-
icies.54
However, when it comes to long-term projections exceeding the
now-standard ten-year window, there was never an “official” set of
assumptions that analysts or the budget offices adopted, or even
used as a reference point. This translated into pervasive inconsis-
tency in methodology, including internal inconsistency in projec-
tions. Take one example: revenues. Projections tend to divide into
two camps. The until-recently dominant school assumes that most
revenues are frozen as a share of the economy after ten years,
unlike in the first ten years when revenues are allowed to vary as
a share of the economy.55 An alternative assumption—and one now
52. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et al., Generational Accounting: A Meaningful Way to
Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 75-77 (1994) [hereinafter Auerbach et al.,
Generational Accounting] (explaining generational accounting); Alan J. Auerbach, The U.S.
Fiscal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We’re Going, 9 NBER MACRO-
ECONOMICS ANN. 141, 168-72 (1994) [hereinafter Auerbach, U.S. Fiscal Problem] (introducing
fiscal gap analysis). Although among the most prominent, Alan Auerbach and co-authors
were not the first economists to focus on projected outcomes and develop comprehensive
frameworks for evaluating the fiscal status of the government taking into account future
cash flows. For earlier work in this vein, see, for example, Willem H. Buiter, Measurement
of the Public Sector Deficit and Its Implications for Policy Evaluation and Design, 30 INT’L
MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 306, 306-46 (1982).
53. CBO first introduced such long-term analysis in its annual Budget and Economic
Outlook in 1996. See CBO, BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006, at 79
(1996). That report included a chapter projecting budget outcomes through 2050. Id. at 69-95. 
54. See OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 33, at 23-32.
55. For instance, this was the assumption used until recently by Alan Auerbach and
William Gale—perhaps the leading sources for long-term budget projections outside the
government. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, The Federal Budget Outlook: No
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being more widely adopted, or at least recognized—assumes that
revenues rise over the long-term as factors such as “real bracket
creep” (real growth which pushes people into higher tax brackets)
drive up receipts.56 The difference is considerable; over seventy-five
years this reduces the fiscal gap by an amount approaching two
percent of GDP.57 But there is little consensus as to the proper
treatment and why. Still, despite the general confusion with regard
to long-term baselines, they are frequently employed in policy de-
bates, and have been helping to drive concern about the track of the
federal budget.58 As explained in Part IV.D, the confusion has led
to considerable exaggeration over the severity of the long-term fis-
cal challenges facing the country or, at least, a misunderstanding
of them.
To summarize, baselines now have a long history in federal
budgeting. It is a history not just of widespread use but also of
confusion and abuse.
II. THE PURPOSES OF BUDGET BASELINES
Alleviating the confusion and abuse surrounding budget base-
lines requires both asking why we use baselines to begin with as
News Is Bad News, 136 TAX NOTES 1597, 1602 (2012) (“We assume that after 2022, most cat-
egories of spending and revenues remain constant as a share of GDP.”). It is also the method
employed in CBO’s long-term alternative fiscal scenario, which was heavily emphasized in
past reports. See CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.1-1. Until
recently, OMB also assumed that revenues stayed constant as a share of the economy. See
OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT:
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 60 (2012).
56. For instance, Alan Auerbach and Bill Gale now offer this additional revenue as
alternative to their base case. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, Forgotten but
Not Gone: The Long-Term Fiscal Imbalance, 23 tbl.1, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2014/03/long-term-fiscal-imbalance-gale/longterm_fiscal_imbalance_
gale.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6D8-LG9U]. In its long-term projections, CBO now emphasizes a
scenario that assumes this revenue growth occurs. See CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET
OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 68 tbl.5-1 (decomposing the increase in revenues over time
among its sources). And OMB has begun to incorporate the additional revenue into its own
projections, substantially improving the fiscal outlook. See OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra
note 33, at 25 (“The projections take into account the automatic growth in revenues that
would result under a continuation of 2015 Budget policies.”).
57. Auerbach & Gale, supra note 56, at 23 tbl.1.
58. For examples of how these long-term projections have been employed, see infra Parts
III.E, IV.D.
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well as understanding what purpose they can serve. This Part sets
out a number of different ways in which budget baselines can be
used to enhance decision making. This is meant to further our
understanding of baselines in two different ways. First, scholarship
on budget baselines (or any form of legal baseline) has rarely asked
why we use baselines in decision making. Second, to the extent the
purposes of budget baselines are discussed in modern scholarship,
they tend to be either dismissed as arbitrary or described as purely
preying on (as opposed to helping overcome) human irrationality:
namely, a bias toward whatever gets framed as the status quo and
an aversion to losing anything relative to that status quo.59 I do not
deny that baselines may sometimes be used in this fashion, but, as
this Part makes clear, baselines can be and are used in ways that
are far more constructive.
A. Setting the Agenda
A baseline can aid policymakers in determining what should be
on the legislative agenda by helping to define and prioritize policy
problems that need to be addressed.60 This is a task that political
scientists have increasingly recognized as central to the policy
making process.61 In particular, recent scholarship emphasizes
Congress’s limited capacity—both as an institution and in terms of
individual members—to focus on particular policy issues and the
resulting importance of agenda setting.62
The first step in agenda setting—defining problems that should
be addressed—cannot be easily separated from the idea of estab-
lishing a baseline. To say that there are problems for policymakers
to address assumes that there is a starting point for the legal
system—a course that the legal system is on. Conversely, the as-
sumption that there are some areas of policy without problems
similarly presumes that policy is on a certain course (in this case,
an unproblematic course).
59. See supra notes 18-19.
60. See BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 4-5 (2005).
61. Id. at 5.
62. See id. at 247-48 (explaining how, given Congress’s limited capacity to focus on
particular policy issues, agenda setting is of primary importance). 
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Return to the case of the “fiscal cliff” invoked at the beginning of
this Article. To make the concepts more concrete, I will return to
this example repeatedly in the next two Parts. At the end of 2012,
the country faced the scheduled expiration of temporary tax cuts
equal to roughly 2 percent of GDP (plus other austerity measures).63
The official baseline showed the country metaphorically jumping off
the cliff and could have been seen as helping policymakers define
the country’s fiscal course as a large problem that needed to be
addressed. CBO produced a series of analyses showing the dramatic
negative effects of the massive scheduled austerity.64
The importance of a baseline to defining policy problems can also
be illustrated by imagining the absence of a baseline entirely. Let
us say policymakers looked at the world as if it were a tabula rasa.
In that case, there would not be particular policy problems per se
that would require attention, nor other policies that could be left
alone. There would be no fiscal cliff because policy would not be on
any course at all. Everything would have to be addressed because
there would be no point from which to start, whether good or bad.
Of course, some policy choices would be better or worse than others.
Policymakers could create problems with their choices. But there
would be no problems at the start that could be identified for future
policy, other than the glaring problem that policymakers would
have no place from which to start and would have to take on the
world as a whole.65
This function of budget baselines—helping to set the policy
agenda—results from the limited ability of both individuals and
institutions to process policy decisions. This is a form of bounded
rationality. That is, both individuals and institutions have a limited
ability to address issues at any given point in time. Baselines can
63. See supra note 41. 
64. See CBO, ECONOMIC EFFECTS 2013, supra note 4, at 3-10 (projecting economic
outcomes under its baseline in which the country went over the fiscal cliff, and comparing
those outcomes to a world in which that was avoided). 
65. The problem of starting from a true tabula rasa is further discussed infra Part IV.A.
There is a theory of budgeting called zero-base budgeting, which attempts to push budget
decisions to be independent of what came before, as if every program were new. See infra
Part IV. This attempt to fully abandon baselines is inherently problematic given the infor-
mation that is lost and has been met with limited success as a result. See id.
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help address that limitation by showing what areas most deserve
attention at a given point.
B. Policy Design: Expected Effects
It is one thing to decide that a policy item is a problem that
should be on the legislative agenda. It is another thing to actually
work toward a resolution of that problem and design a policy re-
sponse. Here, again, baselines can come into play.
Baselines can show the expected course of policy, and thereby aid
in policy design. In other words, baselines can do more than
illustrate what would happen if policymakers sat back and did little
or nothing; they can illustrate what is actually expected to occur.
Whether that course is a good or bad one is an important piece of
information for policy making. Policymakers should know whether
their actions and the expected results are the right or wrong ones.
Unlike the previous function, this does not derive from bounded
rationality and the limited ability to process information. Rather,
any decision maker, irrespective of such bounds, would probably
want to know the expected effects of their actions.
In referring to expected effects, I am referring to a central esti-
mate of the course of policy, around which there is likely to be a
considerable range of uncertainty. Of course, different evaluators
will have different guesses as to the central estimate. But some of
these guesses should be better than others. Some will be more in-
formed than others, and some will have a better record than others
in making these predictions. The better guesses are the ones that
should be more helpful in illuminating decision making.
At first, this may seem like a difficult function to differentiate
from agenda setting. But again, the fiscal cliff can illustrate. In the
lead up, it was certain that the cliff would be on the agenda, and
there was high confidence that policymakers were going to extend
a large share of the tax cuts, even if there was uncertainty as to
exactly how that would happen and whether the country might
temporarily jump off the cliff as policymakers negotiated.66 In fact,
66. Jari Stehn et al., Fiscal Cliff Scenarios: The Not So Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, U.S.
ECON. ANALYST 1-3 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/fiscal-
cliff/fiscal-cliff.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D5N-6AXU].
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President Obama had proposed extending roughly 70 percent of
the temporary Bush tax cuts,67 while the Republicans had proposed
extending nearly all of them.68 That was the difference in their
positions. So judging whether the country was on a good or bad
trajectory when it came to these tax cuts—and whether that should
be changed—required looking not at what would happen if no action
were taken but, instead, if the expected actions were taken.
C. Policy Design: Using the Status Quo as a Reference Point
Another purpose of baselines is to serve as a reference point in
designing policies. By reference point, I mean a marker of where we
are now. That marker can then help inform where we want to go.
There are a few reasons we may want such a marker. First, we
might have limited information about the world around us, and
thus our experience with the starting point may be particularly
useful. In other words, amidst an array of different policy choices,
we often do not know how different alternatives would turn out, or,
at least, we do not know with confidence. We probably have much
better information about policies as they exist now simply because
we have been able to observe their effects in the world around us.
As such, a baseline built on continuation of what we are currently
doing can serve as a useful reference point. To the extent one is
satisfied with policies as they now exist, the reference point is a
67. In the 2013 Mid-Session Review, OMB reported that allowing the high-income tax
cuts to expire, as the Administration proposed, would raise $952 billion from 2013-2022. See
OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
206 tbl.S-2 (2012) [hereinafter OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2013]. At the same time, OMB stated that
the direct cost of continuing all the temporary tax cuts, including the estate tax at its then
parameters, was $2.6 trillion. Id. at 216 tbl.S-8. Extending these tax cuts also made fixing
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) more expensive. OMB reported that extending the
AMT patch would have cost $1.9 trillion. Id. Of this amount, about half was attributable to
the extension of the other tax cuts. See CBO, PUB. NO. 4474, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at 19 tbl.1-6 (2012) (showing that the interaction effect
between the AMT patch and extension of the other tax cuts amounted to about $920 billion
from 2013-2022). Adding this together with the direct costs of extending the tax cuts suggests
that the total cost of extending the tax cuts was about $3.5 trillion. The projected savings of
$952 billion composes somewhat less than 30 percent of that amount.
68. See, e.g., Job Protection and Recession Prevention Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong.
§ 2 (as passed by House, Aug. 1, 2012) (continuing all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for
another year, but not the refundable tax credits expanded in President Obama’s stimulus
package).
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model for future policy. To the extent one is dissatisfied, it serves
as a point of departure. To be clear, there does not have to be any
preference for the status quo for a focus on the status quo to provide
useful information. We need only to have more information about
the status quo than about alternatives for this to be the case.
Second, some may have an actual preference for the status quo.
Those in this camp use the status quo not only as a means by which
to better understand alternative policies, but as a preferred out-
come going forward. The desirability of giving priority to the status
quo is an old and long-contested idea. It goes to the core of conserva-
tive theory. This is the Burkean suspicion of radical change as
compared to gradual evolution; namely, the idea that we know so
little about our complex world that priority should be given to what
we know most—the status quo—and that change should proceed
gradually.69 In modern times, this same idea has motivated the
theory of incrementalism in policy making, a theory that describes
(and sometimes advocates) decision making as “continually building
out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees.”70
These are theories that seek to rationally adapt to human limita-
tions, or what might be thought of as maximizing rational decision
making within constraints. For these theories to be operational,
though, the status quo must be defined. That is where the baseline
comes in, providing information on what represents the status quo.
I do not mean to say that such conservatism is always justified
or is a universal description of the way policy making works. De-
spite Burkean warnings to the contrary, there are situations that
may very well justify radical change. And there are times that poli-
cy making does shift radically, rather than in small increments.71
69. As Edmund Burke wrote:
We must all obey the great law of change. It is the most powerful law of nature,
and the means perhaps of its conservation. All we can do, and that human
wisdom can do, is to provide that the change shall proceed by insensible
degrees. This has all the benefits which may be in change, without any of the
inconveniences of mutation.
4 EDMUND BURKE, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, on the Subject of the Roman Catholics
of Ireland, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 241, 301 (1866).
70. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79,
81 (1959).
71. The modern political science literature tends to describe the political system as
moving in fits and starts—“a pattern of extreme stability and occasional punctuations, rather
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With that said, conservatism and incrementalism cannot be wholly
dismissed as decision-making rules (or even as descriptions); they
have some value.72 But, for them to work at all, there must be a
baseline.
Thus, when it comes to the fiscal cliff, policymakers may want to
use the tax policies in place just before the cliff as a marker. That
is a state of the world with which they are familiar—unlike the
world on the other side of the fiscal cliff, which is considerably
different from what Americans have experienced. Policymakers
might think that marker is a good or bad state of the world, but,
either way, the marker allows them to better gauge alternative tax
policies by reference to this known set. And, for Burkean conserva-
tives or incrementalists, it might even be a state of the world that
is preferred over alternatives. Or, at the least, gradual change from
the marker might be preferred, rather than sudden changes (as in
going off the fiscal cliff).
D. Facilitating Political Accountability
Baselines can also help establish political accountability in two
separate ways. First, baselines can help gauge the degree to which
policymakers have changed the course that policy is on. Second, a
baseline can relatedly be used to project the course that policymak-
ers have put us on. Both of these metrics seem relevant to holding
policymakers accountable—though I suspect that the first may be
more important as a normative matter.
Take one conception of accountability offered by the political sci-
entist Andreas Schedler: “[T]he notion of political accountability
carries two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation of
public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing;
and enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose
sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties.”73
than either smooth adjustment processes or endless gridlock.” See JONES & BAUMGARTNER,
supra note 60, at 5.
72. As the political scientists Jones and Baumgartner note in revising the theory of
incrementalism: “Incrementalism was not wrong; indeed we show that it was probably
understated by its proponents. But it is far from the full story. It must be combined with a
theory of punctuated equilibrium to reach its full potential.” Id.
73. Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE:
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I assume here that political accountability is in fact normatively
desirable.
Both prongs of accountability—policymakers reporting on what
they have done and the public, or some other body, sanctioning
policymakers for violating their duties—require delineating the
policies for which the policymakers are responsible.74 In reporting
their actions to the public, it makes sense for officials to identify the
policies that are theirs and for the public to then adjudge policymak-
ers based on the policies of those officials.75 Absent this ownership
of policies by the public officials, accountability makes little sense;
there is little point in holding officials accountable for policies for
which they are not in some sense responsible.76
This is why I suspect the first way baselines can help establish
accountability is probably more meaningful as a normative matter.
By gauging the degree to which policymakers have changed policy,
the focus is on outcomes that policymakers can (and have) affected.
This is in contrast to simply looking at the course policymakers
have set us on, which the policymakers may or may not have been
able to change.77
Gauging the degree to which policymakers have changed the
course of policy requires comparing the course before and after the
relevant policymakers took power, in other words, comparing two
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 14 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds.,
1999).
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 17, 19.
76. To give an extreme (if hopefully evocative) example: even if one might desperately
desire everlasting summer, there is no good reason to hold policymakers responsible for the
onset of winter. Yes, it has occurred on their watch, but it is not something for which the
policymakers are responsible in any sense.
77. To be sure, there are other ways to measure responsibility for policy that could be at
least as meaningful for the purposes of political accountability. For instance, one might
compare the expected course of policy to possible alternatives that policymakers could have
affected, perhaps weighting the possibilities by the relative difficulty of achieving them. This
would have the benefit of attributing outcomes to policymakers if they could have changed
those outcomes, even if the ultimate policy result was the same course policy was on before
they took power. This has the benefit of not attributing outcomes to policymakers to the
extent that they had no ability to change course. With that said, this requires imagining
states of the world as they could have been and evaluating the relative difficulty of achieving
those states of the world—which may be even more difficult (and abstract) than asking what
course policy was on before and after a policymaker took power.
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baselines.78 First, there is a pre-policy baseline: the course that
policy was on before the relevant policymakers took the reins.
Second, there is a post-policy baseline: the course that policy is on
now, with the current policymakers in control.
The difference between these two baselines measures the change
that occurred while a certain set of policymakers was in charge, and
this change is one way of assessing policymakers’ impact. From this
perspective, policymakers are less responsible for anything in the
pre-policy baseline, as compared to the change they have affected
from that point.
Again, return to the temporary tax cuts and the fiscal cliff. The
idea here is that previous policymakers had put the country on an
expected course whereby most, if not all, of the tax cuts would be
made permanent, even if the policymakers had not formally enacted
their expectations into law.79 This would constitute the pre-policy
baseline. Current policymakers should be held responsible (or at
least more responsible) for the difference between this pre-policy
baseline and the post-policy baseline, rather than responsible for
everything that is set to occur, namely, the full cost of the tax cuts
and their effects. In this case, current policymakers would not be
charged with the cost of extending most of the tax cuts, even as they
enacted the law that did so. Importantly, this notion of political
accountability requires a starting point from which to measure.
E. Enforcing Budget Targets
Given the chaos that sometimes reigns in federal budget
negotiations,80 one could be forgiven for thinking that budgeting is
a lawless territory of partisan strife. Although at times it might
seem that way, policymakers in fact sometimes set targets to help
govern the game. These targets—sometimes self-proclaimed and at
78. See, e.g., BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. [CRS], BASELINES AND
SCOREKEEPING IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1 (2012).
79. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in Bud-
get Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/politics/
congress-shutdown-debate.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5RBX-PEX7] (describing the “rapid-fire
back and forth legislative maneuvers” the two parties engaged in during the waning hours
before a government shutdown).
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other times formally enacted into congressional rules or stat-
utes—facilitate policy making and political accountability. And a
baseline is often needed to get these targets to work.
Before going on, it might be helpful to briefly consider why
policymakers set budget targets in the first place. A collective of
policymakers (such as Congress or Congress working with the
President) can set budget targets to coordinate action. There are
multiple actors involved in budget decision making, and communi-
cation among those actors can be challenging, especially in divisive
political environments.81 Budget targets can serve as a means for
these various actors to agree on a unified framework that guides
the budget decisions they will make.82
The economist Alan Auerbach expands on this point and explains
specifically how budget targets can coordinate action by serving as
a pre-commitment mechanism.83 He describes how a budget rule set
up by a majority in Congress—and that could be overturned by a
majority—might still change legislative outcomes:
For example, suppose that each legislator prefers a low overall
deficit to a higher one, but also wishes to promote his or her own
spending priorities. With no budget rule in place, there may be
no commitment mechanism in place to facilitate co-operation on
keeping spending low.... Thus, the outcome achieved under a
budget rule might be consistent with the contemporaneous
wishes of the majority, while at the same time representing a
different outcome than would occur without the budget rule in
place.84
In other circumstances, budget targets are used not as a coord-
inative device, but instead as a means of flagging to the public a
81. See, e.g., Matt Bai, Obama vs. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/magazine/obama-vs-boehner-who-killed-the-
debt-deal.html [http://perma.cc/85RD-VNCJ] (describing the politically fraught negotiations
between President Obama and then-House Speaker John Boehner, which were frequently
derailed by the brinksmanship of their respective parties).
82. Id. (explaining that, in issuing an initial dollar figure for new government revenue
to then-Speaker Boehner, President Obama’s negotiators expected to keep crossing out their
number, moving down to meet Boehner’s rising number, until the two sides met).
83. Alan J. Auerbach, US Experience with Federal Budget Rules, CESIFO DICE REPORT
41, 43 (2009).
84. Id. at 43-44.
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policymaker’s fiscal position. This links back to the concept of polit-
ical accountability.85 For instance, a policymaker might unilaterally
declare that a piece of legislation, perhaps even legislation that the
policymaker is writing, should cost no more than a certain amount
of money or that the legislation should not add anything to the
deficit.86 The idea is to highlight for the public the effects of a
policymaker’s legislation.
In setting budget targets, baselines come into play in two ways.
First, if the target is set in terms of change in spending, revenues,
or the deficit (or any other metric of change), there must be a base-
line against which to measure.87 In other words, there must be a
starting point by which to identify and define change. Second, if the
target is set in terms of projected outcomes, rather than change,
there must again be a baseline set of policies defining the legislated
course that underlie the projection.
The temporary tax cuts of the last decade can again serve as an
example, as baselines played an important role in the way they
were structured. In particular, policymakers set the tax cuts to
expire in order to take advantage of the official baseline rules that
respected temporary tax measures as actually temporary. First,
they wanted to avoid one of the budget enforcement rules. Given the
fast-track procedure policymakers were using, they could not in-
crease the deficit outside the ten-year budget window without trig-
gering a super-majority vote.88 This would have required them to
85. See supra Part II.D.
86. See, e.g., Billy House & Erik Wasson, Deficit, War Funds at Center of House
Republican Budget Fight, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
politics/articles/2015-03-19/house-republicans-in-standoff-over-deficit-war-funds-in-budget
[http://perma.cc/G7J7-NBEP] (describing Republican Senator Trent Franks, a member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, objecting to a bill that would provide $19.5 billion in
military funding because the offsets were not specified, and therefore he could not ensure
that they were deficit-neutral).
87. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET
PROCESS 7 (2014).
88. See William G. Dauster, The Congressional Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 4, 26-34 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds.,
2008) (describing the reconciliation process and restrictions on it). This was a result of the
“Byrd rule” governing the reconciliation process. Id. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were
enacted using this fast-track process. Id. Among other benefits, the reconciliation process
avoided having to break a filibuster in the Senate, and so passage required fifty-one votes
rather than sixty votes. Id. However, if the legislation increased deficits outside the window
of the budget resolution, this would have allowed a motion requiring sixty votes to waive. Id.
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garner sixty votes rather than just fifty-one votes in the Senate.89
Second, separate and apart from this issue of budget enforcement,
proponents had set a target for the total cost of the tax cuts to
which a number of policymakers were committed.90 However, these
two constraints were easily manipulated given how the baseline
was constructed. The proponents in 2001 could make the tax cuts
temporary to avoid a super-majority vote and help hit the publicly-
stated cost target. 
F. Aiding Private Sector Planning
So far, the uses for baselines I have identified are focused on the
decision making of policymakers or the decision making of the
voters in electing their policymakers. But baselines also aid the
private sector in its own planning.
The tax and spending policies of the government matter to the
private sector. That is, the expected course of those policies—and
uncertainty around that expected course—affect the decisions
private actors make. To take a few examples: this might be in the
form of an individual planning for her retirement. In that case, the
expected Social Security and Medicare benefits should affect how
much she chooses to put away for retirement.91 Or it might be in the
form of a person deciding whether to make an investment and
assessing the tax rate that the government might impose on the
The tax cuts were enacted as temporary in part to avoid the sixty-vote threshold. See Gale
& Orszag, supra note 40, at 1554 (describing how tax cuts were sunsetted in part to avoid the
Byrd rule); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2011) (“For
instance, the conference committee sunsetted the entirety of EGTRRA before the end of the
budget window to avoid the Byrd Rule.”).
89. Gale & Orszag, supra note 40, at 1554.
90. In order to attract moderate Senators, the 2001 tax bill was cut back to hit a target
of $1.35 trillion as scored under the official baseline rules. See, e.g., Fowler W. Martin, US
House-Senate Tax Bill Negotiators Reach Accord, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., May 26, 2001,
Factiva, DOC. NO. dj00000020010711dx5q03vhk (“The Bush administration and conservative
Republicans originally wanted $1.6 trillion in tax cuts, but were forced, during the
Congressional budget process, to settle for $1.35 trillion when centrist Senators from both
political parties balked at the larger number.”).
91. See, e.g., Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Effects of Social Security Reform on
Private and National Saving, in SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: LINKS TO SAVING, INVESTMENT,
AND GROWTH, at 115-18 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Conference Ser. No. 41, 1997), http://
www.bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf41/con41_10.pdf [http://perma.cc/DE3S-ZBHZ].
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investment’s return.92 Or it might be in the form of a business
assessing how much product to take to the shelves based on a
projection of economic activity over the coming months, which will
in part be dependent on government policies.93
Not surprisingly, there is, in fact, a market demand for predic-
tions of government fiscal policy. Private analysts such as Goldman
Sachs generate nuanced analysis of the course of the federal budget
and its effect on the economy.94 These analysts create their own
budget baselines, projecting the expected course of government
policies, and then employ those baselines in their analysis of econ-
omic trends.95 Again taking the fiscal cliff as an example: in the
midst of that debate, private sector analysts released reams of
predictions about how that standoff would be resolved and the
resultant effects on economic activity.96
G. Serving Irrational Biases
Finally, baselines can influence decision making through what
can be described as purely “irrational” channels. In recent litera-
ture, this is the mechanism that has received, by far, the most
attention, often to the complete exclusion of any other purpose for
a baseline.97
There is now considerable behavioral literature exploring what is
sometimes called “loss aversion,” the “endowment effect,” or  “status
92. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 216 (3d ed. 2011)
(describing how the hurdle rate—the threshold at which it makes sense to make an
investment—is defined in after-tax terms.
93. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY DURING THE GOVERNMENT
SHUTDOWN AND DEBT LIMIT BRINKSMANSHIP 1 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/weekly_indicators_report_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/SWZ4-MFXV] (describ-
ing how the shutdown and debt limit brinksmanship in 2013 not only reduced government
activity but led businesses to reduce investment and hiring due to the uncertainty).
94. See, e.g., JAN HATZIUS ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT:
SHRINKING FASTER 6-7 (2013) (giving updated budget projections through 2023).
95. See id. at 5.
96. See, e.g., NEAL SOSS & JAY FELDMAN, CREDIT SUISSE, HOW STEEP IS THE FISCAL CLIFF?
6 (2012) (estimating the fiscal effects of different scenarios and identifying a “most likely”
scenario); Stehn et al., supra note 66, at 2-3 (describing different scenarios, including their
“base case,” for resolution of the fiscal effect, and how they would affect economic perform-
ance).
97. See supra note 19.
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quo bias.”98 As scholar David Gamage summarizes, also in the
context of baselines: “These three labels refer to related phenom-
ena—that individuals dislike losses more than they like gains, or
that individual preferences are biased toward whatever they view
as the status quo.”99 Importantly, recent behavioral research has
questioned the degree to which this phenomenon is a significant
force in human decision making.100 To the degree this phenomenon
is not important and other forces are at play, this could give even
more reason to focus on the other purposes of budget baselines, as
this Article has done.
To the extent they are real, these behavioral phenomena are
thought to be driven by the framing of the decision, rather than the
underlying substance.101 Importantly, in this context, baselines do
not help facilitate a rational decision-making process or construc-
tively overcome problems of limited information or processing
capacity.102 Rather, the baselines potentially play directly into the
underlying irrationality.103 This distinguishes these behavioral
phenomena from the other ways in which people can use baselines
to make decisions—either in completely rational decision-making
processes or as ways to overcome the limits of our information and
rationality.
Take “loss aversion”: Here, the framing of the starting point mat-
ters. If a policy is described as a tax increase, the policy might be
less popular than if it is described as a tax cut, even if the resulting
level of taxation is exactly the same (since the tax increase is
framing the policy as a “loss”).104 Or in terms of programs, benefit
cuts may be seen as bad policy compared to maintaining benefits or
98. Gamage, supra note 19, at 799-800.
99. Id. at 800.
100. See Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 30-46 (2013) (cataloguing recent
evidence that endowment theory does not explain human behavior and arguing that legal
scholarship has ignored this new evidence, to its detriment).
101. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Barron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2005) (defining these “behavioral” mechanisms as ones that
result from people “react[ing] to the form of a choice or decision problem, even where the
substance is held constant”) (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., id. at 1759.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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increasing them, even if the level of benefits is the same in all
cases. And whether a policy represents an increase or decrease in
taxes or spending is defined by the baseline—the starting point.
Some baseline battles may be about one side or another trying to
take advantage of these irrationalities to achieve their desired
policy preferences. Again looking back at the temporary tax cuts:
When advocating for extension of the tax cuts, those who wanted to
make them permanent tended to describe a failure to do so as a tax
increase—measuring from a baseline in which the tax cuts were
permanent.105 By contrast, those who wanted some part of the tax
cuts to expire would, more often, describe continuing them as a
further tax cut.106 While neither side would say it outright, it seems
that both sides were, in part, trying to frame the debate to lead
people to their preferred policy outcome. With that said, the use of
baselines in the tax debate did not always cleanly align in this way.
For instance, the Obama Administration often used a baseline in
which expiration of the high-income tax cuts was measured as a tax
increase—its preferred policy—in part to claim credit for the deficit
reduction.107
However, it is wrong to see baselines as solely playing into ir-
rational decision making as they have sometimes been described in
the past. As explained here, baselines provide useful information in
a number of ways for enhancing decision making.
105. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
106. See Adam M. Samaha, On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 GEO. L.J. 97, 118 (2014)
(“[P]eople who wanted current tax rates extended could say that they opposed a ‘tax increase’
(focusing on resulting rates), while those who supported higher tax rates could say that they
opposed another ‘tax cut’ (focusing on current law).”). For an example of a supporter of
extending the tax cuts describing the alternative as a tax increase, see Curtis S. Dubay,
Taxmaggedon: Massive Tax Increase Coming in 2013, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/taxmageddon-massive-tax-increase-coming-
in-2013 [http://perma.cc/NV5R-L2JV] (“If President Obama and Congress fail to act this year,
an enormous, unprecedented tax increase will fall on American taxpayers starting on
January 1, 2013.”). For a voice on the other side describing an extension as a tax cut and
expiration as allowing tax cuts to go away, see Ethan Pollock, Let the Bush Tax Cuts Expire,
There Are Better Options, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012, 11:30
AM), http://www.epi.org/blog/bush-tax-cuts-expire-better-options/ [http://perma.cc/C97D-
X8ZE] (“Republicans want to extend all of the Bush tax cuts, while Democrats generally
support extending the tax cuts for only the bottom 98 percent of households.”).
107. See, e.g., OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 67, at 206 (showing expiration of the
high-income tax cuts as a tax increase).
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III. A TAXONOMY OF BASELINES
Even if baselines are useful in the ways described above, this
does not tell us how a baseline should be constructed. And, in
particular, it does not explain what set of laws should underlie the
baseline, or why. This question has also been left largely unex-
plored, as if different kinds of baselines all answer the same
questions.108
To put it differently, it is not sufficient to say that the baseline is
the “starting point” for the legal regime. That is because there are
different ways to define the starting point. To borrow Adam
Samaha’s new terminology for defining legal change, it in part
depends on the “object.”109 That is, it depends on what particular
aspect of the legal regime is being held constant (the object) in de-
fining the baseline.110 Thus, simply casting off a few words describ-
ing the baseline without any deeper thought is insufficient and
leads to confusion and incoherence.
In answer to this confusion, this Part offers a taxonomy of budget
baselines, describing what different baselines can offer, relating
108. To be sure, analysts and academics do explore different sets of assumptions with
regard to baselines. But there is rarely, if ever, a serious discussion of the concepts under-
lying those assumptions, or why some assumptions would be better than others. Take the
analysis offered by Alan Auerbach and Bill Gale, two of the leading academics analyzing the
long-term fiscal trajectory. They provide what they describe as a “current policy” projection.
See Auerbach & Gale, supra note 56, at 4. And they make various adjustments to the CBO
baseline in their projection. See id. at 4-5. However, there is never a discussion of the concept
underlying the projection other than to call it “current policy.” See id. at 4-6. As a result, it
is hard to judge the baseline assumptions they make and the alternatives they provide to
their base case (like allowing revenues to grow as a share of the economy after ten years, or
growing discretionary spending with inflation and population rather than inflation alone).
See id. at 15 tbl.1. In fact, the baseline they construct is probably something more like an
uncertainty baseline as described infra Part III.E. 
109. Samaha, supra note 106, at 104. Specifically, Samaha suggests that measuring legal
change requires identifying: (1) an object; (2) a metric; and (3) a timeframe of interest. Id. Or,
to put this in terms of the baseline, one has to define what the baseline is holding constant
(the “object”—as in “current law” or “current services”); the measure in terms of which it is
held constant (the “metric”—as in real dollars or share of GDP or some other metric); and,
finally, the time point from which the baseline jumps. In my own view, the “object” and
“metric” tend to collapse together, but this is still a helpful elucidation of the concept of legal
change, and, thus, provides a framework for thinking about baselines.
110. Id.
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back to the purposes I identified in the previous Part.111 Impor-
tantly, the labels used in this taxonomy have sometimes been
employed in other (and often confusing) ways.112 I differentiate from
these earlier definitions. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing which
baselines are most meaningful. In my view, priority should be given
to variants of what I call the “expectations” baseline, with less
important roles for what I describe as “low attention,” “status quo,”
and “uncertainty” baselines. I also find that a true “current law”
baseline is of only very limited use and simply not viable for most
purposes.
A. Current Law Baseline
I have defined the baseline as the starting point of the legal
regime, and, if that is the case, it seems like there should be a
natural and leading candidate for budget baselines—namely,
current law. The “object” should be literally the words on the page
of the codebooks. Simply crack open the books, and voila, the
baseline is there. Yes, it would require interpretation and analysis,
which could be challenging, but it should largely avoid deeper
questions about what should underlie the baseline. Some intelligent
111. I have found only one other source that offers a basic taxonomy of budget baselines
like this. In early testimony as CBO’s first director, Alice Rivlin briefly offered her thoughts
on the purposes of baselines (or what she called “budget projections”). See generally CBO,
STATEMENT OF ALICE M.  RIVLIN BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (Apr. 3, 1975).
She broke those projections into four categories, which are related to the taxonomy I use
here: a “current services” projection (the equivalent of my status quo baseline); a “most
likely” projection (the equivalent of my expectations baseline); a “most feared” projection
(something akin to my policy uncertainty baseline although not conceptualized in the same
way); and a “desired course of policy” projection (not a baseline, but rather a proposed set of
policies). Id. at 5-8. Rivlin offered brief thoughts on each of these options—notably, caution-
ing against reading too much into the “most feared” projection, id. at 7-8, and calling for
clarity by asking those doing such projections to specify the kind of projection that they are
actually running, id. at 10.
Rivlin’s brief testimony, when compared to much of the writing on baselines that would
follow, is a paragon of clarity. Unfortunately, it seems to have been lost to the ages, and its
lessons along with it. In some sense, the project I take on here builds on these early thoughts
that Rivlin offered on baselines, and adds a deeper conceptual layer by discussing in detail
the relative purposes of these baselines rather than just differentiating the types. I come to
somewhat different conclusions (such as giving priority to the expectations baseline over the
others), but the idea is the same—to clarify exactly what kinds of information different
baselines convey. See id. at 4-5.
112. See, e.g., infra note 118.
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commentators have in fact expressed support for a current law
baseline, at least in the context of tax provisions, as a way to min-
imize budget gimmicks.113 However, the current law baseline is of
only limited interest. In particular, it helps in a certain form of
agenda setting but, even in that regard, “low attention” baselines,
discussed in the next section, may be more useful.
A true current law baseline—as the name suggests—shows what
would happen if no further legislation were enacted. And, in a very
literal sense, it aids policymakers setting the calendar to determine
what legislation should be considered and enacted. As described
earlier, a current law baseline projection of the temporary tax cuts
in 2012 showed policymakers that there was trouble on the horizon
absent action.114 And, every year, a true current law baseline would
show large parts of the government shutting down absent renewal
of annual appropriations—again, indicating appropriations should
be on the “to do” list.115
Beyond its limited role in setting the legislative calendar, current
law can also help to some degree in enforcing fiscal targets. Specif-
ically, at least when it comes to some discrete programmatic areas,
current law can serve as a baseline against which to measure costs.
But even with regard to discrete areas, the current law baseline can
be gamed by enacting temporary, costly legislation that is intended
to be permanent, as described earlier and elaborated on in Part
IV.C. With that said, the current law baseline cannot be used in
enforcing overall fiscal goals because such a projection would
assume expiration of all annually appropriated programs among
other outcomes that no one expects to occur.
The current law baseline supplies little information beyond this,
and the above examples illustrate its limitations. Congress was
going to address the fiscal cliff one way or other—the only uncer-
tainty was how much of the tax cuts would be made permanent and
when. The same is true of annual appropriations; they will get
done, even if not always on time. Congress does not need much of
a reminder to put these on the legislative agenda. Further, current
113. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
115. See generally CLINTON T. BRASS, CRS, RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS (2013).
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law does not show the expected effects of policies, and therefore
cannot help policy making or private sector planning in that way.
Nor does the current law baseline hold current service levels
constant and so serve as a reference point. Finally, it does little to
establish political accountability because it does not indicate the
actual expected effect of policy action. Take the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts; they were enacted as temporary, but the Bush Administration
seems to deserve some of the blame or credit (depending on your
point of view) for their now permanent effects, and current
policymakers deserve less of the blame or credit for having made
them permanent than a current law baseline would suggest.
The bottom line is that “current law”—although perhaps the
obvious candidate for building a baseline—is useful only in limited
circumstances as a way of setting the legislative calendar and
perhaps helping to enforce budget targets, though with the caution
that current law has proven eminently gameable in enforcing
budget rules.
B. Low Attention Baseline
Another type of baseline is what I call a “low attention” baseline.
In this case, the “object” is law, assuming policymakers pay little
attention to it. It is a baseline explicitly showing policymakers what
would happen if they do not make a certain area of policy a focus of
their agenda.
This is to be distinguished from the current law baseline. Despite
the barriers to legislation, sometimes the easiest course of ac-
tion—the way to pay the least attention to an area—is, in fact, to
legislate. Take annual appropriations. Failing to appropriate at all
is not the way to pay relatively little attention to the area. That
case—a government shutdown—would tend to focus maximal
attention on at least some parts of the appropriations process.116
116. The 2013 government shutdown vividly illustrated the degree of attention paid to
appropriations in the case of a shutdown. A Lexis search of the New York Times database for
articles that include the term “government shutdown” indicates that from October 1, 2013
to October 31, 2013—the month of the two-week government shutdown at the start of fiscal
year 2014—there were 263 separate articles in the New York Times alone that mentioned
the phrase.
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Rather, “low attention” might look like continuing the same real
funding from the previous year.
Like the current law baseline, this baseline can help with agenda
setting—and perhaps even more so. It does not simply aid in setting
the legislative calendar. It helps indicate what areas actually re-
quire substantial focus from lawmakers. In fact, when analysts use
projections to show that a certain area needs attention from Con-
gress, it is this low attention baseline, as opposed to a current law
baseline, on which they should be focused. To be clear, the low
attention baseline may coincide with current law in some cases, but
it need not—and in important cases (like appropriations), it will
not.
With that said, the low attention baseline does not help much in
terms of the other purposes of baselines. It is like the current law
baseline in this way. The baseline can serve to set the agenda, but
probably not much beyond that. When it comes to some areas (like
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts), there may not even be a plausible “low
attention” path. In that case, a political battle was brewing that
would garner much attention, and the question was how it would
be resolved—not what would happen if policymakers did not put it
on the agenda. And, even in serving the purpose of helping to set
the agenda, the baseline is highly speculative; in many circum-
stances, it is not obvious what the path would be if policymakers
truly paid little attention to an area.
C. Status Quo Baseline
Yet another type of baseline looks at what we are experiencing at
this very moment (the object) and then holds constant what we are
experiencing now (the benefits provided by a given government
program or the amount of taxes people are paying right now) going
forward. I will refer to this as a “status quo” baseline. This is meant
to capture a concept similar to the Congressional Budget Act’s “cur-
rent services” baseline, or at least some interpretations of that base-
line.117 Notably, I do not mean this baseline to incorporate future
changes in law if they differ from what is being experienced now.118
117. See supra notes 20-21, 30 and accompanying text.
118. Some interpretations of the Congressional Budget Act’s baseline would incorporate
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This baseline can serve the purpose of being a reference point,
providing policymakers with a sense of what it means to continue
the status quo into the future. As I described in Part II, there is
something helpful about knowing what law is in place at this very
moment.119 At the least, it is a state of the law we have experienced,
and some may see rational reasons to prefer the status quo as a
matter of course over alternatives.120
However, this status quo baseline comes with limitations on its
face. In particular, it does not provide information that would fulfill
the other purposes of budget baselines. For instance, a status quo
baseline, as defined here, tells us little about the expected course of
budget policy. The tax and spending programs in place may be
expected to change. Looking back at the fiscal cliff: one of the tem-
porary tax cuts at issue in 2012 was an over-$100-billion-per-year
payroll tax cut which had been enacted two years before,121 and that
most expected to go away. A status quo baseline would have
projected it to continue, even as no major political leader was
advocating to make it permanent.122 Continuing the payroll tax cut
changes in tax and mandatory policy that are scheduled to occur under current law. See
supra note 30. Such changes may very well be what we expect to occur, but, in my view,
including such changes in a status quo baseline confuses this baseline with an expectations
baseline, when these baselines are actually conveying different types of information. The
status quo baseline illustrates what would occur if current policies were held constant,
whereas the expectations baseline shows what would occur based on current expectations.
See infra Part III.D for further discussion of the expectations baseline.
With that said, there is some question as to what it means to experience a policy now. To
the extent people are forward-looking and have information about the future, current
experience may in some sense incorporate the expectations of the future. For instance, people
may spend more or less today incorporating the expected effects of future fiscal policies.
Thus, under some assumptions, the status quo baseline may, to a significant degree, collapse
into the expectations baseline. The relevance of a status quo baseline therefore largely
depends on people differentiating between the policies in place today and those in the future
and believing that they have more information about what is happening now.
119. See supra Part II.C.
120. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
121. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309-3310. For the initial cost estimate, see JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE TAX RELIEF, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, AND
JOB CREATION ACT OF 2010, at 4 (2010). The payroll tax cut was scheduled to be in place for
only 2011, but it was later extended through 2012. See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 1001, 126 Stat. 156, 158.
122. Neither President Obama nor any of the Republican leadership had proposed to make
it permanent.
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in the baseline would therefore tell us little about the expected
effects of budget policy. A status quo baseline also would not be
particularly helpful in establishing political responsibility. It seems
odd to blame or credit a policymaker with responsibility for an over-
$100-billion-per-year tax increase for allowing a tax cut to expire
that no one ever aimed or expected to make permanent.
In application, the limitations of this type of baseline are even
more significant. This is because the baseline is meant to inform
policy decisions about the future; although what is happening at
this very moment may be descriptively interesting, we cannot
change what has already occurred. And what is relevant to the fu-
ture is not simply what is happening now but what it would mean
for the same policies we are experiencing now to continue in the fu-
ture. However, defining what it means to continue current policies
into the future can, at times, seem like a dive down a rabbit hole.
For instance, what does it mean to continue the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts twenty or thirty years down the line when incomes and the
economy more broadly are likely to be very different? One could
argue that holding policy constant might mean increasing the tax
cuts with either inflation or, alternatively, incomes. Over time,
these different strategies would produce two very different results.
When it comes to government programs, the problems become per-
haps even more difficult. For instance, what does it mean to hold
defense services constant after September 11th? With the United
States facing a new terrorism threat to its security, simply adjust-
ing funding levels for inflation would seem to produce a different
kind of service than before. Or what does it mean to hold Social
Security constant as the Baby Boomers retire?
This does not mean that a status quo baseline is useless.
Especially for relatively short projection periods, a status quo base-
line can still provide useful information. It can be possible, or at
least easier, to translate what is happening right now to those
future circumstances, which are similar to today, even if not exactly
the same. We might adjust for inflation and program participation,
while recognizing that this estimate of the “status quo” is not quite
the literal “status quo.” It is an adjusted status quo that reflects
some changes but holds a number of meaningful items constant.
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However, that information can degrade significantly as the pro-
jection continues deeper into the future. How far into the future
does it become meaningless? That probably depends on the tax
policy or program, but my intuition is that even the current ten-
year budget window is pushing the limits for how meaningful a
status quo baseline can be. At some point, the world is sufficiently
different that trying to hold policy constant becomes a fruitless
endeavor.
D. Expectations Baseline
An expectations baseline reflects what is expected to occur in the
future. The object here is the law as it is expected to be. The future
is not some undifferentiated mass of possibilities. There are more
and less likely outcomes. In short, there is an expected path, even
if it may be an uncertain one.
When expectations are invoked, this immediately raises the
question of whose expectations. Here, I mean to refer to what is
objectively the best central estimate of the future path of the bud-
get. That is, some predictions should be better than others—with
smaller errors and less bias relative to what actually occurs. Admit-
tedly, identifying the “best” projection is no small feat. Perhaps it
would be delivered by some combination of nonpartisan budget
experts, whether at official government agencies like CBO or at
independent think tanks, that closely watch budget developments
and on which policymakers, the press, and the public rely. But the
point is that I do not mean expectations to refer to anyone’s
subjective expectations of the course of the budget irrespective of
the likely accuracy of the guess.
This expectations baseline has the potential to offer considerable
information. As suggested earlier, the expected effects of policies
should matter to both policy making and private sector planning.123
The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were expected to have a very different
effect than the one actually stated in law.124 At the time, they were
123. See supra Parts II.B, F.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
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expected to be continued at least in significant part.125 Thus, that
expectation should have informed the decision to enact them.
Perhaps less obviously, the expectations baseline can prove useful
in setting the policy agenda, establishing political accountability,
and enforcing budget rules.126 In terms of agenda setting, the most
relevant information is the question of what would happen if an
issue is not brought onto the agenda as of now—information
provided by what I call the “low priority” baseline. And the “low
priority” baseline can actually be conceptualized as a particular
type of expectations baseline. It is what is expected to occur, contin-
gent on policymakers not paying much attention to an area. In
terms of political accountability, it seems particularly relevant to
look at the expected course on which policymakers have set us
(what I described earlier as the post-policy baseline) and to compare
that with the expected course before policymakers took over (the
pre-policy baseline). Finally, in terms of budget enforcement, using
a baseline that better reflects expectations can potentially avoid
certain kinds of gamesmanship. Whereas a pure current law base-
line can lead policymakers to enact temporary legislation and claim
that it costs less than its actual expected effect,127 an expectations
baseline avoids this gaming. Furthermore, the baseline can be used
to enforce targets in terms of overall projected budgetary outcomes
(deficit and debt levels),128 unlike a current law baseline, which is
useless for such purposes.
To be clear, setting an expectations baseline involves its own
share of speculation. There is the actual technical question of how
to estimate the expected policies in the face of uncertainty. The best
method would likely be some probabilistically weighted average of
various policies, interacted with economic factors. In practice, that
may prove complicated across the full range of the budget. Another
possibility is a projection of the most likely set of policy outcomes,
which is not necessarily the same thing but may still provide
similarly useful information.
125. See supra note 40.
126. See supra Parts II.A, D, E.
127. See supra text accompanying note 40.
128. See supra Part II.E.
2015] BASING BUDGET BASELINES 183
The long-term fiscal challenge generally, and the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts specifically, highlight the issue of uncertainty. The strong
expectation of experts and markets is that the government will
finance itself without defaulting on its debt.129 By this I mean the
expectation is that taxes will eventually be raised and spending cut
in some combination that is sufficient to balance the government’s
books—or, more technically, sufficient so that the federal govern-
ment fits within its long-term budget constraint.130 In the case of
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, this means that, as a matter of
budgetary arithmetic, their enactment will eventually lead to offset-
ting tax increases and spending cuts of equivalent magnitude to
finance these tax cuts.131 To be clear, the long-term fiscal challenge
may not be resolved with some combination of policies that people
consider optimal—that part is by no means necessary—and the
same is true specifically of the policies needed to finance the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts. Nonetheless, an expectations baseline should,
over the long-term, reflect whatever combination of policies is
expected to close the long-term gap and finance deficit-increasing
policies.
129. Market actors certainly do not seem to expect a default on the federal debt. Presently,
the federal government can borrow at very low interest rates, even over the long-term. See
Selected Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
data.htm [http://perma.cc/3L5R-XL4Z] (last updated Dec. 19, 2013). And commentators note
that, while there is a market in credit default swaps on Treasury debt to insure against
default, the only value of the credit default swap is probably to protect against a temporary
nonpayment—for instance, in the event that Congress is late in raising the debt limit. See
Matt Levine, Why Would Anyone Buy Credit Default Swaps on the U.S.?, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Sept. 26, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-09-26/why-would-
anyone-buy-credit-default-swaps-on-the-u-s- [http://perma.cc/3XVZ-WSGB] (noting that “[i]n
U.S. government CDS, the value of the credit protection is more or less zero,” but that there
may be some value to the swap in the case of a temporary delay in payment). 
130. The federal government faces a budget constraint such that the net present value of
the government’s future stream of revenues must equal the net present value of future
government consumption plus the current value of government debt. See Auerbach et al.,
Generational Accounting, supra note 52, at 75. If the government were to violate this “budget
constraint,” the government essentially would have defaulted on its debt, taxing resources
away from lenders in order to meet its needs. See id.
131. William G. Gale et al., Distribution of the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts and Their
Financing, 103 TAX NOTES 1539, 1539 (2004) (“Popular discourse about tax cuts frequently
ignores a simple truism: Someone, somewhere, at some time will have to pay for them. The
payment may be in the form of increases in other taxes or reductions in government pro-
grams; it may occur now or later; it may be transparent or hidden. But iron laws of
arithmetic and fiscal solvency imply that the payment has to occur.”).
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In previous work, I made an effort to identify what policies might
be employed to close the long-term fiscal gap, noting that a com-
bination of policies already proposed, though not enacted, by
policymakers could do so.132 My approach of projecting “least
common denominator” deficit reduction—that is, the least each side
had proposed in any given area—was one way to try to identify the
expected course of policy.133 There are certainly other ways, but
efforts like these are needed to guess the future course of budget
policy over the long-term and then assess whether that course is a
good or bad one.
E. Policy Uncertainty Baseline
Some might say, though, that an expectations baseline showing
no fiscal shortfall—and the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and other
deficit increasing policies, as financed—assumes away a rather
large problem. Perhaps we expect that policymakers will eventually
figure out a way to deal with the deficit, but that does not mean
they have done so already. It is a rather curious chicken-and-egg
problem. Should an expectations baseline show the long-term fiscal
problem as solved when we remain uncertain as to how that will
actually occur? Should we sit back and relax, secure in the relative
certainty of future action?
The answer to this is “no.” We should probably differentiate the
fiscal policies that are highly uncertain from those that are less so.
At the least, we can try to measure the degree to which policymak-
ers have generated more uncertainty than they would have if they
had better specified a sustainable long-term fiscal path.
This brings us to the “policy uncertainty” baseline. While the
name might seem exotic, it is a baseline that should be familiar to
anyone who follows federal budget debates, even from afar. When
you see a projection of the federal budget on an unsustainable
trend—as in deficits or debt rising perpetually into the future—you
are probably looking at a policy uncertainty baseline, or at least a
baseline that is akin to this. And, of course, this is familiar. The
many warnings of the unsustainability of the federal budget often
132. See generally Kamin, supra note 14.
133. Id. at 58-59.
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come with just such graphs, with lines ascending into the
heavens.134
Given how often such baselines get rolled out, it might come as
a bit of a surprise that it is rarely (if ever) specified what those
baselines are in fact projecting.135 Yes—the technical assumptions
underlying the projections are given.136 But the theoretical frame-
work—as in what all of those assumptions are meant to capture—is
not actually specified.137 It certainly is not a current law baseline,
as it does not reflect the debt limit in place and much of the federal
government disappearing as appropriations expire, among other
items in current law. It probably is not a low attention baseline or,
if it is, it is not a particularly meaningful one—since, even if deficits
do not get placed at the top of the agenda today, they seem very
likely to be on the agenda if debt rocketed up. Even debt at current
levels has sparked negotiation after negotiation.138 Further, it prob-
ably is not a status quo baseline, as these baselines often incorpo-
rate changes in services (like spending cuts or tax increases) that
people expect to occur but have not yet happened.139 Additionally,
134. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], LONG-TERM FEDERAL BUDGET
SIMULATIONS 6 (2014) (showing a graph with skyrocketing debt as a share of the economy
under both the “baseline extended” and the “alternative” scenarios); NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 10-11 (2010) (showing debt rising on an
unsustainable trajectory, and citing to CBO’s then-alternative fiscal scenario and using the
figures to build the case for a “looming fiscal crisis”).
135. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 134, at 2.
136. See, e.g., id. at 2-4, 13-15, 17.
137. This is true for almost any long-term projection. But the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) projection provides a good example. In its annual update, GAO usefully clarifies
that these projections are not what it expects to occur. Id. at 2. As GAO says, “[t]hese
simulations are not predictions of what will happen in the future, as policymakers would
likely take action to prevent damaging out-year fiscal consequences.” Id. But GAO does not
say what the projections actually represent as a theoretical matter, other than a bundle of
technical assumptions that it specifies. Id. at 3, 4, 13-15, 17. Or, to put this in terms of a
question, if GAO is not projecting what it expects to occur, what exactly is it projecting?
138. See, e.g., Zachary Goldfarb, Long Debate over Debt Ceiling Could Harm Economy,
Reports Says [sic], WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/long-
debate-over-debt-ceiling-could-harm-economy-reports-says/2013/10/03/992c482e-2c35-11e3-
b139-029811dbb57f_story.html [http://perma.cc/Q5M8-CPT9]; Jeanne Sahadi, Debt Ceiling:
8 Things You Need to Know but Wish You Didn’t, CNN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2013, 11:20 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/27/news/economy/debt-ceiling-faqs [http://perma.cc/RYG4-
5FNR].
139. See supra note 111. For instance, all the long-term baselines that I have seen reflect
the scheduled (and gradual) increases in the Social Security normal retirement age that are
set to occur under current law and were first enacted in the early 1980s. See, e.g., CBO, 2013
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as I discussed, status quo baselines tend to lose coherence as they
look further and further into the future.140 And, finally, it is not an
expectations baseline, at least as defined above, because few expect
that the United States will actually have a debt load equivalent to
several hundred percent of GDP (and rising) at some point in the
future.
This brings me to what I am calling the “policy uncertainty”
baseline. Based on policymakers’ legislative actions and proposals,
we may project a certain minimum level of taxes—a level below
which it is unlikely taxes will fall—and a certain maximum level of
spending—a level above which spending is unlikely to rise. The gap
between these two levels will be closed, but there is substantial
uncertainty about the composition of the policies that will fill that
gap and the timing. This uncertainty is the focus of the policy
uncertainty baseline. To put this in Samaha’s terminology, the
“object” in this case is the amount of uncertainty that policymakers
generate due to their failure to better specify a path to a fiscally
sustainable future.141
This can be conceptualized in terms of the fiscal gap—a metric of
the fiscal shortfall popularized by Alan Auerbach.142 This gauges
the size of the tax increases or spending cuts needed to stabilize the
debt-to-GDP ratio over given periods of time, which is one metric of
fiscal sustainability.143 The fiscal gap essentially quantifies the
amount of policy uncertainty that exists. Compared to the baseline,
spending will have to be cut by a certain amount and taxes raised
by a certain amount, and there is confidence that such actions will
LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 50 (describing a gradual increase in the
normal retirement age). To give another example, before the payroll tax cut expired in 2012,
these long-term projections still incorporated the assumption that the payroll tax cut would
expire, as was widely expected. See, e.g., CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra
note 11, at 9 tbl.1-1 (following current law in both the “extended baseline” scenario and the
“extended alternative fiscal” scenario). These examples show how these long-term projections
do not capture the status quo.
140. See supra Part III.C.
141. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
142. See Auerbach, U.S. Fiscal Problem, supra note 52.
143. William G. Gale & Benjamin H. Harris, Reforming Taxes and Raising Revenue: Part
of the Fiscal Solution, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 563, 564 (2011).
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occur;144 what is uncertain is the timing and composition of that
deficit reduction.145
There are costs to such uncertainty, making the uncertainty
worthy of quantifying.146 For instance, this fiscal gap generates
uncertainty about the future structure of the Medicare and Social
Security programs, and that makes it difficult for people to plan for
retirement.147 There is also uncertainty about future tax rates,
making it more difficult for businesses to make investment deci-
sions.148 In addition to making people and businesses more uncer-
tain about how government fiscal policies will affect them in the
future, the unresolved fiscal gap also increases uncertainty for
holders of government debt, and raises the probability that finan-
cial markets might change their expectations about the probability
of some share of the fiscal gap being resolved through direct default
or inflation. In short, because of uncertainty, there is some risk of
a fiscal crisis, with costly, sharp changes in market expectations.149
The policy uncertainty baseline can serve many of the same
purposes as the expectations baseline. It can help set the agenda by
showing the degree of uncertainty if policymakers do not put deficit
reduction on the agenda now; it can help hold policymakers ac-
countable for increasing that uncertainty or reward them for reduc-
ing it; and it might even be used to enforce budget targets by not
allowing policymakers to increase future uncertainty by enacting
unpaid-for policies, for instance.150 However, it probably provides
little information for private sector planning because planners must
actually take a best guess at how uncertainty could be resolved.
144. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, A Tax Bite Tailored to Help All, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/business/higher-taxes-on-everyone-could-ease-spending-
cuts.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/B5SB-433H].
145. See MARC LABONTE, CRS, REDUCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT: OVERVIEW OF POLICY
ISSUES 1, 11 (2014).
146. See id. at 11.
147. See Craig S. Hakkio & Elisha J. Wiseman, Social Security and Medicare: The
Impending Fiscal Challenge, 1 ECON. REV. 7, 7-8 (2006).
148. See Sandra Block, Many Find it Hard to Plan Ahead as Tax Uncertainty Looms, USA
TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/story/2012-03-22/impact-of-tax-
uncertainty-businesses-taxpayers/53708328/1 [http://perma.cc/V7YH-XKGW] (last updated
Mar. 23, 2012, 9:18 AM).
149. See CBO, FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A FISCAL CRISIS 1 (2010) (outlining the risk
and potential consequences of a fiscal crisis).
150. See supra Part III.D.
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With that said, this policy uncertainty baseline is not an expecta-
tions baseline, and does not convey some of the important informa-
tion that would be incorporated in such a baseline. It does not show
the actual expected effect of policies. In particular, one effect of
federal fiscal policy is to shift resources between one generation and
another,151 and we do not know the degree to which fiscal policy will
do so unless we look at an actual expectations baseline—not an
uncertainty baseline.152 Or, returning to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
again, we do not know the actual incidence of those tax cuts unless
we utilize an expectations baseline to speculate who will end up
financing them with either lower spending or higher taxes.153 The
uncertainty baseline should not be confused with an expectations
baseline that conveys such important information.
F. Where Does the Official Baseline Fit?
Finally, there is the official baseline. This is what I am calling the
baseline that CBO uses in some of its budget projections and in
estimating the cost of legislation. As described in Part I, many of
the assumptions underlying this official baseline were written into
law in 1985 and then significantly amended in 1990.154 While that
baseline was mandated for only certain budget enforcement pur-
poses, CBO and, to some degree, OMB also adopted it for purposes
of baseline budget projections—with both sometimes emphasizing
alternative baselines where the “official” one was unrealistic.155 This
baseline is unlike the others I have described here in that there is
not a single motivating concept behind it. Rather, it is a mixture of
concepts. That is not a problem per se, especially to the extent the
baseline is used primarily for budget enforcement. However, this
151. See David N. Weil, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Fiscal Policy, LIBR. ECON.
& LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FiscalPolicy.html [http://perma.cc/79C5-4VUP]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
152. See infra Part IV.D.
153. In fact, one set of analysts attempted to capture the full incidence of the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts by speculating on the financing that would eventually be enacted. See Gale et
al., supra note 131, at 1544-45.
154. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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official baseline could be improved, especially when it comes to the
treatment of temporary policies.156
Table 1 summarizes assumptions underlying the official baseline.
First, it is important to observe that it is not a true current law
baseline. While sometimes described as such,157 it deviates from
current law in a number of key ways. These include assuming:
(1) continuation of annually appropriated funding; (2) that the fed-
eral government will continue to issue debt above the debt limit;
(3) continuation of a number of major mandatory programs, like
TANF and farm price supports, that are scheduled to eventually
expire; (4) continuation of a number of excise taxes devoted to trust
funds (the major one being the gas tax) that are also scheduled to
expire.158 The point is that whatever logic underlies the official
baseline, it is not strictly adhering to current law.
Rather, it is an assortment of baseline concepts. In some cases,
the official baseline does follow current law (and none of the other
baseline concepts). This was the case with the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts. The baseline assumed that the tax cuts would expire as
scheduled. However, in other cases, the official baseline adopts
something closer to an expectations or status quo concept. For
instance, take the baseline’s continuation of major mandatory
programs that are scheduled to expire; their continuation is almost
certain to occur, and the baseline thus also reflects continuation of
the state of the world today. Or, take annual appropriations. Here,
CBO largely follows the discretionary caps now in place, reflecting
something probably closer to an expectations concept. The assumed
funding level is below the status quo—adjusted for measures like
inflation—but certainly above current law, in which appropriations
are not continued at all.159 And, in some respects, the baseline
156. See infra Part IV.C.
157. See, e.g., CBO, FISCAL YEARS 2011 TO 2021, supra note 50 (describing on the cover of
the report its debt projection as reflecting “current law”).
158. For the assumptions underlying the baseline, see Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 257, 104 Stat. 1388-573, 591-93 (establishing the baseline and setting
out the assumptions to be used).
159. As noted in Table 1, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) requires that
discretionary funding grow with inflation for baseline purposes, irrespective of the caps in
place. Id. CBO has chosen to deviate from the BEA baseline in this case. CBO, BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 65 (2014).
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measures policy uncertainty to the extent it shows the government
on an unsustainable trajectory.
Table 1: “Official” Baseline
Budget Category “Official” Baseline
Debt Limit Assumed to be increased
Trust Funds
Assumed to continue spending and
taxing at scheduled levels even once
programs are insolvent (such as the
highway trust fund).
Annually Appropriated
Spending
Funding at capped levels; uncapped
funding grown with inflation from cur-
rent year.*
Mandatory Spending
Current law except:
• Temporary programs over $50 million
per year and enacted before 1997 are
automatically assumed to continue as
in effect in their last year.
• Same treatment for programs en-
acted after 1997 except assumed to
expire if explicitly specified as a tem-
porary program.
Revenues
Current law except expiring excise taxes
dedicated to a trust fund are assumed to
be continued.
* The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act requires that discretionary funding be grown with
inflation for baseline purposes, irrespective of whether there are caps in place. CBO
has chosen to instead follow the capped levels in its official projection.
Although the official baseline reflects a mixture of concepts, it
still has the potential to be used effectively for budget enforce-
ment. As described in Part IV.C, consistency and clarity are more
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important than intellectual coherence when a baseline is used for
budget enforcement. With that said, the official baseline could cer-
tainly be improved for such purposes. As I explain later, the official
baseline has been undermined as an enforcement device by the
games policymakers have played with temporary tax policies. This
gives reason to try to amend the official baseline to make it more
consistent with the actual expected effects of those temporary mea-
sures. Not only could that improve budget enforcement, but it also
would have the ancillary benefits of making this official baseline
more useful for other purposes, such as evaluating the effects of
policies and establishing political accountability.
G. Summing Up: A Focus on Clarity and Expectations
There may be other types of baselines that can be imagined, but
the categories above should capture the main candidates. From this
taxonomy, I take away three main lessons. First, there needs to be
a focus on clarity for those building and using baselines. To say that
a baseline is “realistic” or some other brief summary phrase is
entirely inadequate. There are different ways to define a starting
point and, depending on how it is defined, a baseline will be useful
in very different ways. Second, “current law” might seem like an
obvious and easy way of defining the baseline, but it is inappropri-
ate for most of the purposes for which baselines are used. Finally,
other baselines—and perhaps, especially, the expectations base-
line—are of greater use for many more purposes. In particular, the
expectations baseline is useful for setting the agenda, assessing the
expected effects of policies, establishing political accountability,
enforcing budget targets, and aiding private sector planning. It is,
in other words, the baseline most likely to be useful for a set of im-
portant purposes. Table 2 below roughly summarizes the different
types of baselines and the purposes for which they are most
appropriate.
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Table 2: Uses of Budget Baselines
Types of Baselines
Current Law
Low
Attention
Status Quo Expectations
Policy
Uncertainty
Official
Baseline
Agenda Setting
X 
(what should
be enacted)
X
(what should
receive
attention)
X
(if contingent
on “low
attention”)
X
(if contingent
on “low
attention”)
Policy Design:
Expected Effects
X X
Policy Design:
Status Quo as a
Reference Point
X
Political
Accountability
X X
Budget
Enforcement
X
(manipulable)
X
(less
manipulable)
X
(less
manipulable)
X
(manipulable)
Private Sector
Planning
X
IV. LESSONS FOR BASELINE DEBATES
The prior Part attempted to rigorously consider the kinds of
baselines we can use and what information they provide. This Part
applies this thinking to a number of ongoing debates about federal
budget baselines.
I now address four frequent issues that arise in baseline debates:
whether we should use a baseline at all, whether the baseline
should increase in nominal terms, how to handle policy cliffs, and
what to do with (and how to think about) long-term projections.
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A. Getting Rid of Baselines Is Not a Viable Option
The question of whether we should use baselines at all has been
a long-standing issue in budget circles. At the federal level, that
debate has largely been resolved by the now multiple decades of
projections and cost estimates from CBO, OMB, and budget ana-
lysts that rely on baselines. With that said, there are still proposals
to radically deemphasize or eliminate baselines at the federal
level,160 and having now pursued in some depth the question of
what different baselines have to offer, it is informative to return to
this debate. It is also necessary. This Article has so far engaged the
question of the purposes of baselines and how they can be conceptu-
alized, but it has not engaged the issue of whether baselines are
necessary at all. If they could be abandoned entirely, then this
analysis becomes superfluous; the right baseline is no baseline. Not
surprisingly, I conclude that baselines should be used, although I
do not argue that they should necessarily be the dominant decision-
making tool in all situations.
There is an entire, much-debated theory pinned to the idea of
living in a world without baselines called “zero-base budgeting”
(ZBB). Peter Pyhrr first developed the theory in the late 1960s for
budgeting at Texas Instruments.161 ZBB was later introduced into
government budgeting in 1973 by then Georgia Governor Jimmy
Carter. And Carter, with considerable fanfare, brought this method
to the federal budget process—although it was quickly abandoned
and never again used extensively at the federal level.162 In the
broadest strokes, ZBB is meant to budget without relying on what
had been done before. Spending, including the “base” (what was
160. See, e.g., Zero-Based Budgeting Ensures Responsible Oversight (ZERO) Act of 2013,
H.R. 239, 113th Cong. (requiring, among other things, that OMB issue guidelines telling
agencies that they should assume that their baseline budget is zero and justify all spending
as if it were a new expenditure). 
161. See Peter A. Pyhrr, The Zero-Base Approach to Government Budgeting, 37 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 1, 1 (1977) (applying the theory to government budgeting); Peter A. Pyhrr, Zero-
Base Budgeting, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 111-12 [hereinafter Pyhrr, Zero-Base
Budgeting] (outlining the theory of ZBB). 
162. For a description of this history, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERFORMANCE
BUDGETING: PAST INITIATIVES OFFER INSIGHTS FOR GPRA IMPLEMENTATION 46-51 (1997)
(describing how ZBB was gradually deemphasized by the Carter Administration and then
largely abandoned once President Reagan took office).
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spent before), is supposed to be fully and regularly evaluated. This
is intended to be in contrast to an “incremental” process of budget-
ing, which focuses evaluation on the increment, as in some percent
increase or cut from the base.163
I will not delve into detail as to exactly how ZBB was meant to be
operationalized. Suffice it to say that, for each program area (or
“decision unit” in the parlance of ZBB), budget analysts are tasked
with developing “decision packages,” detailing exactly what can be
purchased for each level of funding and justifying that particular
level of services.164 The various decision packages—across decision
units—then get ranked in terms of priority, and a central unit
assigns resources based on these rankings and overall resource
constraints.165
There may be something to be gained by abandoning baselines,
or at least trying to. At least some of the intuition behind ZBB was
later affirmed by some of the behavioral economics literature dis-
cussed earlier.166 To the extent that anything framed as the status
quo leads to irrational decision making (and a bias towards it),
then, arguably, we should force ourselves to think outside this
frame. If we define nothing as the status quo, and if we abandon
any idea of a baseline, then perhaps policy decision making can be
improved in this way.
But there is also much information to be lost if we give up
baselines entirely—and, in my view, far too much information. This
Article has already discussed in some detail what baselines have to
offer, but it is still useful to briefly highlight what it means to use
no baseline at all, in terms of the two ways that baselines can in-
form policy design: by showing the expected course of policy, and by
defining the status quo as a reference point.
First, in the absence of any kind of expectations baseline, we lose
the ability to engage in any kind of long-term planning. Pure ZBB
requires us to pretend that the future is something of a blank slate.
163. See Pyhrr, Zero-Base Budgeting, supra note 161, at 111 (opening his article with a
quotation from Arthur Burns, Counsellor to the President, describing a budgeting system in
which “every agency ... make[s] a case for its entire appropriation request each year, just as
if its program or programs were entirely new”). 
164. See id. at 112-14.
165. See id. at 116 (describing the process of ranking decision packages).
166. See supra Part II.G.
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Furthermore and relatedly, it would require ignoring the long-term
implications of policy decisions—as in the degree to which decisions
today affect the likely outcomes in the future.
The political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, in his classic work The
Politics of the Budgetary Process, makes a similar point and vividly
characterizes what it means to be without what I would call an
expectations baseline.167 He compares this to living with the type of
instability seen in the developing world.168 In his words:
Only poor countries come close to Zero Base Budgeting, not
because they wish to do so but because their uncertain financial
position continually causes them to go back on old commitments.
Because past disputes are part of present conflicts, their budgets
lack predictive value; little stated in them is likely to occur.
Ahistorical practices, which are a dire consequence of extreme
instability and from which all who experience them devoutly
desire to escape, should not be considered normative.169
Second, in the absence of any kind of status quo baseline, de-
cision makers would have to shield themselves from information
about what we are doing at this moment and could not use that
experience as a reference point. It is enough to leave policymakers
at sea. Take the Defense Department: each and every time pure
ZBB is used would require determining from the ground up how
much we need to spend on defense.170 The question would not be
whether we are now spending too much on a given defense system
or defense in a certain region, but rather, without reference to any
information about current spending levels, how much we should
spend to begin with. Without reference to what we are currently
doing (and how it is working out), that becomes a difficult—if not
impossible—endeavor.
167. See generally AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed.
1984).
168. Id. at 217.
169. Id.
170. To repeat the quote from a presidential advisor that Peter Pyhrr offers in the opening
to his article on ZBB, it would be as if “every agency ... make[s] a case for its entire
appropriation request each year, just as if its program or programs were entirely new.”
Pyhrr, Zero-Base Budgeting, supra note 161, at 111 (quoting Arthur Burns).
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To be clear, keeping baselines as part of budget decision making
does not necessarily mean that they must be the focus at every
stage. Even though baselines provide important information, there
is potentially something to be gained by deemphasizing them at
certain stages of decision making so as to destabilize an irrational
bias toward the status quo, to the extent one exists. In other words,
perhaps there is some way not to throw out the baby with the bath-
water.
The failures of ZBB in practice, though, demonstrate how chal-
lenging it can be to deemphasize the baseline. First, in application,
most versions of ZBB do not actually eliminate use of a baseline.
One of the “decision packages” is often some version of the status
quo, or at least defined relative to that level.171 Second, ZBB has
proved incredibly intensive in terms of administrative resources—
and with perhaps little to show for it (though that is a matter of
some dispute). This was the federal government’s experience when
it dabbled with ZBB under President Carter. It resulted in agencies
devoting considerable resources to draw up budget recommenda-
tions that looked much like they did before.172
The bottom line is that budget baselines should be and are here
to stay. Doing away with them simply gives up too much informa-
tion.
B. Baselines Should Not Be Frozen in Nominal Terms
Even if they may accept the use of some budget baselines, many
conservatives harken back to the time when the “base” was simply
171. See, e.g., GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING: MODERN EXPERIENCES
AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 3 (2011) (describing how in zero-base budgeting, at least one of
the decision packages should be a “current services” package, essentially setting a status quo
baseline); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 162, at 48 (describing how, during the
Carter Administration’s attempt at zero-base budgeting, many agencies defined minimum
funding levels in terms of an arbitrary percentage of current funding—generally between 75
and 90 percent).
172. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 162, at 48-49 (noting how, after the
first year of ZBB in the Carter Administration, “[f]ew significant budgetary actions were
identified as resulting from ZBB, and some questioned the utility of the many hours spent
by program managers, budgeteers, and top managers on ZBB”); see also Allen Schick, The
Road from ZBB, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 177, 177 (1978) (“The first president to promise a zero
base budget has delivered the most incremental financial statement since Wildavsky
canonized that form of budget-making more than a dozen years ago.”).
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the prior year’s nominal spending level. They argue that should be
the point of comparison, at least when it comes to annually appro-
priated spending. However, a baseline in this form seems intended
to misinform and, if adopted, could undermine a number of the
purposes for which baselines can be employed.
In 2012, and again in 2014, House Republicans passed legislation
eliminating any inflation adjustments for annually appropriated
programs from the official baseline;173 their logic appears to apply
to any baseline, whether official or not. Upon the legislation’s sec-
ond introduction, then Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan
declared: “Families don’t get automatic raises every year. Neither
should Washington.”174 The sponsor, Representative Louie Gohmert,
expanded on that logic, saying that the baseline “has been a trap so
when we simply slow the rate of increase, we are accused of making
draconian cuts. As reckless deficit spending continues, it is
paramount that we be honest about what is an increase and what
is a cut.”175
Advocacy for this is not limited to politicians. The scholar Tim-
othy Muris similarly calls for using the previous year’s nominal
level as the baseline.176 He would use this for all spending (and not
just annually appropriated spending), but then would highlight the
forces that automatically push up nominal spending on mandatory
programs like Social Security (but not annually appropriated ones
like Head Start).177 In his words, “[a]lthough all programs should be
measured against the base of the previous year’s spending, for those
programs that automatically increase the underlying reasons
should be understood and evaluated.”178 He argues against other
baselines because of the complexity involved and the possibilities
for gamesmanship.179 Muris is right to emphasize some of the
173. Baseline Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3578, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, Feb. 3,
2012); Baseline Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1871, 113th Cong. (as passed by House, Apr. 8,
2014).
174. Press Release, Representative Louie Gohmert, Gohmert Praises Baseline Reform
Act of 2013 (May 9, 2013), http://gohmert.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Document
ID=333177 [http://perma.cc/7ALL-JA8M].
175. Id.
176. Muris, supra note 20, at 77.
177. Id. at 77-78.
178. Id. at 77.
179. Id. at 75.
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challenges involved in designing useful, coherent baselines (hence,
the discussion in much of this Article). However, he and others are
wrong to conclude that the simplicity of a nominal freeze provides
a more accurate measure of the course we are on, or the changes
from it.
Returning to Samaha’s conceptualization of legal change, a frozen
baseline sets nominal dollar amounts as the “object.” That is what
it seeks to hold constant. But a baseline like this does not provide
any information actually helpful for decision making. Or, put
differently, a baseline of this form does not capture the starting
point of the legal regime in any meaningful sense.
It is worth briefly running through the potential purposes of
baselines and how this is inconsistent with them. First, to the
extent a baseline’s purpose is to help set the agenda, assuming a
nominal freeze in the absence of attention by policymakers seems
likely to provide faulty information. In particular, a nominal freeze
requires cutting services over time due to the effects of inflation and
growth in population. To the extent policymakers set the budget on
automatic pilot and do not focus much attention to it, such cuts
seem unlikely, especially over the long-term. In other words, if a
policymaker’s goal is to cut the budget after taking into account
items like inflation, it would require raising the issue as a major
agenda item—as was done by Republicans in recent years in
attempts to achieve cuts. This means a low attention baseline would
include growth in spending, certainly in nominal terms.
Second, if the goal is to use the status quo as a reference point,
again, a nominal freeze misinforms. While the figure of $1 billion in
one year has the same number of zeros as $1 billion in years later,
they can buy different things because of inflation and other factors;
presumably, it is the amount of services that matters in these com-
parisons. Long-time budget analyst Richard Kogan illustrates this
in arguing against a baseline with a nominal freeze. He notes how,
in 2000, defense spending ($295 billion) was slightly higher in nom-
inal terms than in 1987, at the height of the Reagan Cold War
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build-up.180 And yet, the military had been dramatically down-sized
over that same period.181 As Kogan reports:
[T]he number of active-duty military personnel fell from 2.2
million to 1.4 million during this period (a 36 percent reduction),
the number of Navy ships fell from 569 to 315 (a 45 percent
reduction), [and] the number of Air Force fighter wings (active
and reserve) fell from 38 to 20 (a 46 percent reduction).182
To compare 1987 and 2000 and declare that defense spending in
2000 is higher ignores the reality of the services actually being pro-
vided.
Third, a nominal freeze does not reflect the probable course of
policy—at least over long periods of time. Because of this, it fails to
provide information that is useful for a number of purposes, in-
cluding policy design, holding policymakers accountable for their
actions, budget enforcement, and private sector planning. All major
categories of government spending have, over long periods of time,
risen in nominal terms,183 and that is certainly a reasonable expec-
tation for the future. In fact, even the writers of the Republican
House Budget Resolution have assumed that annually appropriated
spending keeps up with inflation over the long-term.184 Thus, any
general assumption that spending will be frozen in nominal terms
over long periods is highly unrealistic. Kogan notes how this could
undermine policy planning by, among other things, resulting in
fiscal projections that could wrongly justify tax cuts or entitlement
increases.185 When it comes to political accountability, it seems most
reasonable to credit or blame policymakers for how much they
change policy relative to the previously expected course—and not an
180. RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, “BASELINE REFORM ACT” IS A
STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION 3 (2012), http://cbpp.org/files/1-23-12bud3.pdf [http://perma.
cc/YXK6-5LZN].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See OMB, HISTORICAL TABLE 3.2 OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION AND SUBFUNCTION: 1962-
2020, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals [http://perma.cc/KL4U-CU5K] (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015) (showing rise in nominal spending by category over time).
184. CBO, THE LONG-TERM BUDGETARY IMPACT OF PATHS FOR FEDERAL REVENUES AND
SPENDING SPECIFIED BY CHAIRMAN RYAN 3-4 (2012), http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/03-20-Ryan_Specified_Paths_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/XLH3-7TTS].
185. KOGAN, supra note 180, at 1-2.
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unexpected one (like a nominal freeze). And for enforcing deficit or
debt targets, Kogan’s critique again rings true. The result would be
an unduly rosy forecast that would undermine any such targets.
Finally, the private sector should (and likely would) ignore any such
baseline, recognizing it as an unlikely course for policy.
Muris offers a half-hearted attempt to justify the nominal freeze
in the face of such objections. He argues that issues of realism and
the effects of inflation are relevant only over longer periods of time
(according to Muris, time periods such as five years).186 From year-
to-year, inflation can be ignored, Muris argues, especially if we are
in a low inflation environment.187 This retort is problematic. It is as
if the sum of the parts (the effects of inflation over five years) is
completely disconnected from the parts themselves (the effects of
inflation from year-to-year). If Muris were to agree that it is
realistic for spending to increase with inflation over a five-year
period, why should it be any different over a one-year period, even
if the increment is smaller? If spending did not increase with
inflation from year-to-year, then it would not do so over any longer
period either.
The weakness of these justifications reflects the fact that the
nominal freeze is probably meant to misinform. Advocates of the
frozen baseline want to lower spending. In order to achieve this,
they want to shift the status quo reference point and, potentially,
not be held fully accountable for the cuts they are advocating. In
short, they want to hide budget cuts to the extent possible. To be
sure, that is not necessarily a bad outcome. To the extent larger
budget cuts would be a better policy outcome than the alternative,
a skewed baseline could be justified as a means to an end that the
political system would not have otherwise generated. In other
words, it might be bad information in, but good or better outcomes
out.
However, I am doubtful of this (unstated) justification for two
reasons. First, I am skeptical of the substantive goal of reducing
spending broadly, though that clearly goes to a larger policy debate.
Second, and more importantly, I question whether employing
budget metrics in this way—as political tools with no necessary
186. Muris, supra note 20, at 78.
187. Id.
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connection to actually accurate information—will end up producing
better outcomes. It relies on pulling the wool over people’s eyes and
being able to do so again and again. If all institutions engaged in
policy making in this way, budget metrics would seem to lose any
currency they have. They would not be believed, leaving policymak-
ers and the public blind as to the country’s fiscal path and the ef-
fects of fiscal decisions.
In sum, a nominal freeze seems unlikely to be the right baseline
for any constructive purpose. This is not to suggest that it is easy
to decide on how fast the baseline should grow. That depends on the
question being answered—whether the baseline is trying to hold
services constant, or the expected course of policy, or something
else. And, even after deciding this, it is not necessarily obvious how
the baseline should be adjusted. But the frozen baseline seems like
the wrong answer in most circumstances.
C. Ignoring Policy Cliffs (Much of the Time)
1. Why We Should Ignore Policy Cliffs
Over the last two decades, perhaps the leading baseline contro-
versy centered around how to account for what I am calling policy
cliffs—and, in particular, how to account for the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts. I have already played out the example of the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts through much of this Article, and so it should come as no
surprise that I believe baselines should ignore policy cliffs, much of
the time, in order to reduce baseline abuse. I consider policy cliffs
to be sudden changes in policy compared to what had been experi-
enced up until that point, whether from legislative expirations or
otherwise. The expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are a quin-
tessential example of policy cliffs. Importantly, the problem of
temporary tax legislation and baseline manipulation is not limited
to those tax cuts. This is a game that progressives have played as
well, even if in smaller magnitude than conservative tax cutters. In
recent years, progressives have successfully enacted tens of billions
of dollars per year in temporary (deficit-financed) tax cuts that they
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intend to make permanent and certainly might, akin to the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts.188
Some commentators have expressed skepticism about doing
anything other than following current law or perhaps the official
baseline in the case of such expirations. Ezra Klein, the influential
blogger and reporter, wrote in favor of using what he describes as
a current law baseline going forward.189 He argued that adjusted
baselines—ones that had assumed extension of the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts—had resulted in fiscal irresponsibility.190 In his words:
Because everyone was used to a fake baseline that assumed
their full extension, a supposedly deficit-obsessed Congress
managed to resolve the so-called fiscal cliff in January by
passing a huge tax cut that added trillions to deficits while
calling it, amazingly, a fiscally responsible tax increase. Now
that the fiscal cliff and its attendant uncertainty have been
resolved, it’s time to retire the irresponsibility scenario and rely
simply on the current-law scenario.191
Legal scholar Rebecca Kysar makes something of a similar
point—although perhaps with more fatalism—that baselines will
end up being manipulated irrespective of their underlying assump-
tions.192 After noting that “[t]ypically, the [official] baseline accepts
188. This includes approximately $25 billion per year in expanded refundable credits for
low-income Americans. See OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 33, at 158 tbl.12-2. These
policies were first enacted as temporary measures in the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1002-1004, 123 Stat. 115, 312-15, and the Obama
Administration proposed that they be made permanent. Importantly, the Administration
then stuck these new refundable credits in the baseline as permanent measures so that their
further extension did not count as a cost relative to the Administration’s baseline. See OMB,
FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 33, at 157-58. The policies themselves are laudable; the use
of baselines probably less so. Progressives similarly have added temporary tax subsidies for
energy industries—with the intent yet again of further extending them. See, e.g., Darren
Goode, Energy Incentives to Sweeten Tax Bill?, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2010, 4:23 PM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1210/46153.html [http://perma.cc/WC5Z-62LC] (describing efforts
by Democrats to extend temporary clean energy tax credits that had been added in the 2009
stimulus).
189. Ezra Klein, Want to Fix the Deficit? Get Real, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:36
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-11/want-to-fix-the-deficit-get-real
[http://perma.cc/Z4TH-6NHF].
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally Kysar, supra note 88.
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current law as fixed,” she describes critically how baselines used by
OMB (under both Presidents Bush and Obama) and others assumed
extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.193 From her perspective
(and similar to Klein’s argument), this made it easier to extend
temporary legislation without facing up to the cost of doing so.
Kysar used this to help build her argument against enacting
temporary legislation to begin with, but the point about baselines
seems to be roughly the same.
While I have a certain amount of sympathy for arguments like
those of Klein and Kysar, they ignore the possibility of adjusting the
way baselines deal with the initial enactment of temporary legis-
lation in order to address this kind of gamesmanship. In particular,
if done from the start, ignoring expirations could be used to reduce
gamesmanship and improve baselines—rather than the opposite.
Not only could adjusting the baseline reduce such gamesmanship,
but it could change how we perceive the wisdom of temporary legis-
lation. One of Kysar’s key arguments against temporary tax leg-
islation is that policymakers never face the full costs of their
policies because the baseline later gets manipulated.194 To the
extent that changing baseline assumptions could address this fiscal
gamesmanship, then the case against using temporary tax legisla-
tion—for instance, to force reconsideration of a set of policies at
regular intervals—is weakened.
As I mention above, I would give priority to the expectations
baseline, and this provides a rule that is simple to state, if not
implement: whether to respect a policy cliff should depend on the
expected outcome. This certainly requires more judgment than
simply cracking open the code, but, unlike current law, it is a viable
and meaningful baseline. It would tend to show enactment of
temporary tax cuts as more expensive than a current law baseline,
and it would show further extension as less expensive—which
appropriately aligns with the expected effects of these policy
actions.
To be sure, Klein and Kysar are right to be skeptical of how base-
lines were used in the debate about the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts; it
is just that they ignore the misleading baseline treatment at the
193. Id. at 1028-30.
194. See id. at 1026-33.
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time of enactment. In particular, the error then was to assume that
the country would follow current law. In making that assumption,
supporters were able to minimize the actual expected cost of the tax
cuts.195 Many of those same supporters, including the Bush Admin-
istration, later flipped over to baselines that assumed the extension
of the temporary tax cuts.196 This harnessed the power of expecta-
tions. No one expected most of the tax cuts to go away, and so it was
intuitive to use a baseline that came closer to representing the
likely course of policy. But because these supporters did not use an
expectations baseline from the start, it was a hypocritical maneuver
that generated faulty information for decision makers and the
voting public at the time the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were enact-
ed—and then hid the consequences by flipping baselines later.197
Using an expectations baseline would reduce the opportunity for
such gamesmanship if it was employed consistently. This would
mean that supporters of temporary tax cuts could not toggle be-
tween a current law and an expectations baseline to the degree it
suited them, since expectations would consistently be the focus.
Using an expectations baseline would also come with other benefits.
For example, this approach would highlight the actual expected cost
of the legislation, better holding supporters accountable.198 Addi-
tionally, an expectations baseline would appropriately reflect the
later cost of continuing the tax cuts as largely built into the base-
line—meaning that future policymakers would not be described as
adding to the deficit by continuing the tax cuts.199 Rather, they
would be described as reducing the deficit if they did not continue
them.
This is not to say that all cliffs are fake—though many are. There
are truly temporary policies that we expect to be temporary, such
as fiscal stimulus in the face of a recession. Some degree of judg-
195. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
197. To be clear, there were analysts—especially tax cut opponents—emphasizing the cost
if the tax cuts were made permanent at the time they were enacted. See, e.g., ROBERT
GREENSTEIN ET AL., NEW TAX CUT LAW USES GIMMICKS TO MASK COSTS; ULTIMATE PRICE TAG
LIKELY TO BE $800 BILLION TO $1 TRILLION: FINAL BILL BOTH MORE COSTLY AND MORE
REGRESSIVE THAN ADMINISTRATION PLAN 1 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/5-22-
03tax.pdf [http://perma.cc/S4L9-B7F2].
198. See supra Part III.D.
199. See supra Part III.D.
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ment is therefore required, with the understanding that many of
these cliffs should be ignored in baselines.
I have emphasized how the expectations baseline would approach
policy cliffs. Other than a current law baseline, the other baselines
I discuss would also tend to ignore such cliffs. For instance, a low
attention baseline would show whatever keeps an issue off the
agenda—which, often, prevents a dramatic policy change from going
into effect (like the fiscal cliff).200 A status quo baseline would
simply assume that whatever policy is in place right now would
continue, even if that is not expected to be the case.201 A policy
uncertainty baseline might also assume the cliff is ignored, to the
extent that this reflects some additional uncertainty for how our
long-term fiscal situation will be resolved (as was certainly the case
with the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts).202 Ultimately, just because a poli-
cy cliff is written into the law does not mean that a baseline should
reflect it; rather, it is often to the contrary.
2. Applying This to the Official Baseline
While the above analysis bears on what rules should be used in
building the official baseline employed by CBO and OMB in budget
enforcement, the recommendations need to be adjusted in this con-
text. The preceding discussion suggests that policy cliffs should
tend to be ignored in budget baselines when we do not expect them
to occur—which is often. However, this recommendation requires
assessing the specific cliff involved to decide whether we expect it
to be respected. When it comes to an official baseline, there is no
luxury of wide discretion. Rather, there are a prescribed set of rules
that must be clear to both legislators and the budget offices. Still,
I believe the above conclusions are relevant in setting those rules;
policy cliffs should frequently be ignored there as well.
Perhaps the leading purpose of the official baseline is to act as a
mechanism for budgetary enforcement—for informing policymakers
and the public whether or not those policymakers have achieved
budget targets. As previously noted, some have suggested doubling
200. See supra Part III.B.
201. See supra Part III.C.
202. See supra Part III.E.
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down on the current official baseline.203 From their perspective, the
mistake with the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts was not to consistently
assume their expiration.204 And others, like scholar George Yin,
have even suggested that budget enforcement worked well in the
context of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.205 In simple terms, these
commentators suggest that so long as new laws are fully paid for or
properly taken into consideration, budget enforcement should still
work using the actual laws as enacted. Although the cliffs may be
unrealistic, when Congress inevitably fixes the cliff, the cost of the
new legislation would then be taken into account.
To understand why this latter viewpoint is flawed, it is important
to consider why we have budget enforcement devices in the first
place. These devices are intended as a way for policymakers to
restrain themselves or, at least, highlight when they are being
irresponsible.206 Given that policymakers can always undo the ties
that bind them through later legislation, the efficacy of budget en-
forcement rules can be rightly questioned, but, as suggested earlier,
they do appear to make some real difference in policy making.207 To
be successful, however, these rules must be designed in such a way
that is not susceptible to gaming. The ties must be binding, at least
to some degree. Otherwise, they are useless as commitment mech-
anisms. Using either a pure current law baseline or the current
official baseline has proven insufficient in the context of temporary
tax legislation.
As described above, the official baseline has been easily manipu-
lated.208 Those enacting temporary tax cuts will, initially, empha-
size the cost estimate using the official baseline, which is too low
relative to what is expected to occur. Despite Yin’s call for consis-
tency, supporters of temporary tax measures will often flip over to
an expectations baseline to estimate the cost of continuing the tax
203. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
205. See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 197 (2009) (“Because budget estimating baselines generally
take termination dates seriously, Congress will be confronted with additional costs should
it decide to extend the scheduled 2010 repeal beyond that time.”).
206. See Auerbach, supra note 83, at 43-44.
207. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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cuts and try to ignore the official baseline for further extensions. To
reduce the gamesmanship, the official baseline could simply be
made into something closer to an expectations baseline to begin
with. This would mean that the initial expected cost of the tax cuts
would not be underestimated. There would be no opportunity to
later switch (inconsistently) to an expectations baseline, and fur-
ther extensions would be accounted for properly.
Table 3 suggests ways to reform that baseline.209 In particular, I
recommend that any new provisions added to the tax code or to
authorizing legislation be treated as permanent in estimating the
cost of that legislation if the legislation, on the whole, adds to the
deficit.210 This treatment, assuming automatic extension, could then
be turned off if Congress explicitly designates the provision as tem-
porary in the law. This approach would require Congress to take a
step beyond simply writing an expiration into the law for a provi-
sion to be treated as temporary in the baseline, and would require
Congress to explicitly say that the intent is for the provision to be
temporary. To give this somewhat greater teeth, I recommend
creating a new budget act point of order—requiring sixty votes in
the Senate to override—against the extension of any provision so
that it continues in effect in the year after expiration if the
209. See infra Table 3.
210. An alternative approach would be to treat all temporary provisions as permanent
unless explicitly designated as temporary—irrespective of whether the overall legislation
adds to the deficit. There is some logic to this, given that these temporary provisions are also
often extended. I do not, however, adopt this as the recommended change, since this method
would preclude paying for a policy in short increments, as Congress has done in the past. For
example, this has been the approach to the automatic cuts scheduled to go into effect in
Medicare’s physician payment system. See Mark Merlis, Medicare Payments to Physicians,
HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_
id=83 [http://perma.cc/3RFN-SMQF]. In this case, Congress has repeatedly enacted tempora-
ry patches to avoid most of the cuts and paid for that cost. See Actually, the SGR Has Slowed
Health Care Cost Growth: 98% of Doc Fixes Since 2004 Have Been Fully Paid For, Resulting
in $140 Billion in Deficit Reduction, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET: THE BOTTOM
LINE (Mar. 13, 2014), http://crfb.org/blogs/actually-sgr-has-slowed-health-care-cost-growth
[http://perma.cc/Q53C-G73F]. The concern might be that these temporary provisions could,
nevertheless, get incorporated in people’s expectations, leading to an unpaid-for extension
down the line—sneaking a deficit-increasing policy into the baseline. There is something to
this concern; however, until Congress begins abusing the system in this way (which it has
not so far), there instead seems to be an expectation that, when Congress has paid for an
item in the past, it will do so again.
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provision had previously been designated as temporary.211 The re-
form is not as radical as it may seem. As I have described, the offi-
cial baseline already deviates from true current law in a number of
ways—and already assumes that a number of major mandatory
programs are permanent despite being temporary in law.212 So, this
proposed reform does not break new ground in that sense. It is
simply meant to better align the official baseline with actual
expectations, and, thus, enhance budget enforcement. It would also
improve the official baseline for other purposes, like holding policy-
makers accountable for the likely effect of their actions, both when
temporary measures are enacted and when they are continued.
This, of course, is not a panacea. Policymakers can find new ways
to game the system or override the system entirely. Still, this re-
form seems likely to improve budget enforcement on the whole, and
allow the estimates to be better used for other purposes. This
reform is also one that policymakers on both sides of the aisle could
potentially accept as one that better binds their hands going
forward.
211. Of course, the Senate already has a sixty-vote threshold in the form of a filibuster.
Nonetheless, the additional sixty-vote threshold may make some difference. First, it means
that no such provision could be incorporated in reconciliation legislation—and so not subject
to the filibuster—without triggering a sixty-vote point of order. Second, the additional point
of order may change the politics of a vote; whereas a filibuster vote is simply to end debate,
this vote could be cast as overriding budget enforcement and fiscally irresponsible. Finally,
the filibuster is under some threat in the Senate, and, if it were eliminated, the remaining
super-majority vote requirements would carry additional weight.
Some may still question the efficacy of a point of order given that a point of order can be
changed. In other words, policymakers may want to bind their hands, but, if it becomes too
easy to turn off or on in any particular circumstance, the commitment mechanism may be
largely ineffectual. To combat this potential problem, the point of order could be enacted via
a law, which requires sixty votes in the Senate, rather than a budget resolution, which
requires fifty votes in the Senate. The traditional understanding is that, if created by sixty
votes, a point of order would require sixty votes to remove it. The point of order could still
be eliminated with sufficient support, but it would be more difficult to change.
212. See supra Table 1.
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Table 3: Baseline Used for Budget Enforcement: Recommended
Changes
Budget Category Official Baseline Recommended Change
Mandatory Spending
Current law except:
• Temporary programs
over $50 million per
year and enacted
before 1997 are
automatically assumed
to continue as in effect
in their last year.
• Same treatment for
programs enacted after
1997 except assumed to
expire if explicitly
specified as a
temporary program.
• Trust funds assumed to
continue spending at
scheduled levels even
once insolvent.
Same as BEA except:
• All temporary
provisions in deficit-
increasing
legislation are
continued unless
explicitly specified
as a temporary
provision.
• Budget act point of
order if temporary
provision repeated
in the year after it
has expired.
Revenues
Current law except
expiring excise taxes
dedicated to a trust fund
are assumed to be
continued.
D. Clarifying Long-Term Baselines
Although one of the more powerful arguments for the existence
of baselines is the ability to engage in long-term planning, it turns
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out that very long-term planning (as in over a multi-decade period)
raises its own unique set of challenges and misconceptions. These
long-term projections are often motivated by an understandable
desire to evaluate whether the country is on an unsustainable fiscal
course, given fiscal pressures such as the retirement of the Baby
Boomers and rising health care costs.213 However, as I have
discussed, the very concept of projecting an unsustainable fiscal
course is conceptually challenging.214 This has led to considerable
confusion among policymakers and academics, as well as exaggera-
tion of the fiscal challenges we face. To be clear, the fiscal future is
not necessarily rosy; there are probably problems to be addressed.
But the types of problems and their degree have often been
misidentified and exaggerated, in large part because of confusion
about the baseline.
1. How the Long-Term Fiscal Challenge Has Been Exaggerated
The long-term fiscal challenge has been misidentified and exag-
gerated in at least two ways. First, the nature of that challenge is
often misconstrued, as analysts and policymakers describe projec-
tions of unsustainable fiscal trends as if they were depictions of
what we expect to occur—when the projections instead are quanti-
fying uncertainty, not the expected course. Second, the assumptions
underlying a number of these projections make little sense and
overstate the degree of uncertainty.
To begin, and focusing on how uncertainty gets confused for
expectations, I return to a theme explored earlier: the difference
between expectations and policy uncertainty baselines.215 To repeat,
the expectations baseline reflects a best guess of the policy course
we will experience.216 If what we are focused on are deficits and
debt, then this means taking a best guess at the path of these as
213. Some analysts also look to long-term projections because they believe that short-term
ones are largely meaningless, or at least easily manipulated. See Auerbach et al.,
Generational Accounting, supra note 52, at 74 (“In short, it is impossible to measure the debt
and the change in the debt—the deficit—in a way which carries a useful underlying economic
meaning.”).
214. See supra Part III.E.
215. See supra Part III.E.
216. See supra Part III.D.
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time goes on. And, importantly, an expectations baseline would gen-
erally abide by the government’s intertemporal budget constraint,
with the net present value of income approaching the net present
value of liabilities (over the infinite horizon).217 By contrast, an
uncertainty baseline roughly reflects the degree of uncertainty as
to how the government will in fact meet that intertemporal budget
constraint.218
Many, if not most, long-term projections—at least those people
pay attention to—are uncertainty baselines;219 yet, they are fre-
quently described as if they reflect expectations. Take the introduc-
tion to the Bowles-Simpson Commission report. The Commission
paints a grim picture:
Debt held by the public will outstrip the entire American
economy, growing to as much as 185 percent of GDP by 2035....
Federal debt this high is unsustainable.... By making it more
expensive for entrepreneurs and businesses to raise capital,
innovate, and create jobs, rising debt could reduce per-capita
GDP, each American’s share of the nation’s economy, by as
much as 15 percent by 2035.220
Most readers would probably be left under the impression that,
as of now, we expect a debt level of 185 percent of GDP in 2035 (and
rising), with very large negative effects on the economy as a result.
Yet the actual expectation is probably different from that. Policy-
makers are likely to take action before the federal debt reaches 185
percent of GDP.
In confusing uncertainty and expectations baselines, the long-
term fiscal problem is misidentified. The implications of taking on
vast amounts of debt—thus reducing incomes considerably for
future generations and risking a fiscal crisis—is very different from
the cost of uncertainty of how we will avoid that fate, even if we are
relatively confident that we will. To be clear, neither outcome—high
debt or high uncertainty—is good for the country. However, it is a
217. See Auerbach et al., Generational Accounting, supra note 52, at 75 (describing the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint).
218. See supra Part III.E.
219. See, e.g., supra note 134 and accompanying text.
220. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 134, at 11.
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problem of a different magnitude if we really believed that the debt
were on track to be 185 percent of GDP as of 2035 (and rising rap-
idly from there) as opposed to simply being uncertain how that fate
will be avoided. Baselines like the one being used by the Bowles-
Simpson Commission are roughly measuring the uncertainty of how
our long-term fiscal situation will be resolved. They are not actually
trying to make a best guess at the track of federal fiscal policy.
Turning to the assumptions underlying those projections: the
degree of uncertainty implied by these projections has been exag-
gerated because some of the assumptions make little sense, and
perhaps can be attributed to the fundamental confusion over what
these projections are meant to capture. Take CBO’s alternative
fiscal scenario in its 2012 long-term report,221 a version of which
was underlying the figures cited by the Bowles-Simpson Commis-
sion.222 This is a scenario in which CBO does not follow its tradi-
tional baseline but instead offers what is meant to be a more
realistic take on the budget outlook. Or, in the words of CBO,
“[m]any budget analysts believe that the extended alternative fiscal
scenario is more representative of the fiscal policies that are now (or
have recently been) in effect than is the extended baseline sce-
nario.”223 In 2012, this CBO projection painted a very dark picture,
with a seventy-five-year fiscal shortfall equivalent to 8.7 percent of
GDP224—meaning that some combination of tax increases and
spending cuts equivalent to $1.3 trillion per year (in today’s terms)
would be necessary to close the long-term shortfall. Even properly
interpreted as an uncertainty baseline, that is quite a bit of uncer-
tainty in terms of the timing and composition of deficit reduction.
However, even if correctly framed as measuring policy uncertain-
ty, this CBO scenario exaggerated the extent of the problem because
of technical assumptions that did not align well with the unstated
conceptual underpinning. I have taken issue with this baseline
elsewhere225 and others followed suit.226 Most problematically, CBO
221. See CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, at 8-9 tbl.1-1 (outlining
assumptions underlying the alternative fiscal scenario).
222. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 134, at 10-11.
223. CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, at 3.
224. Id. at 21 tbl.1-3.
225. See Kamin, supra note 14, at 59-60.
226. See Michael Linden & Sasha Post, The United States’ Long-Term Debt Problem Isn’t
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assumed a return to historical spending levels as a share of the
economy for annually appropriated spending—which is much high-
er than the track to which policymakers have committed over the
current decade. Less problematically, CBO assumed that revenues
are frozen as a share of the economy after the end of the ten-year
budget window, despite the fact that revenues would continue
rising as a share of the economy under current law. Both assump-
tions—and perhaps especially the first—created something like a
treadmill for policymakers. The more policymakers committed to
reducing the deficit, the more CBO doubted that the deficit reduc-
tion would continue.
Perhaps one could defend the CBO move as fitting into the policy
uncertainty framework, but the justifications are relatively weak.
The argument is that it is uncertain whether policymakers will
maintain their commitment to historically low spending (as a share
of the economy) on annually appropriated programs. And it is also
uncertain whether policymakers will allow revenues to rise gradual-
ly as a share of the economy. However, it is a thin justification since
it is inevitable that we will have some combination of higher rev-
enues and lower annually-appropriated spending as a share of the
economy than we have had in the past in order to address the rising
costs of the major entitlement programs. There seems to be rela-
tively little policymakers can do to allay that uncertainty as of now,
to the extent bipartisan agreements (such as those reducing
annually appropriated spending) fail to do so.
By contrast, in its 2013 report CBO dramatically deemphasized
its alternative fiscal scenario.227 It instead focused on a scenario
that, among other things, assumed that annually appropriated
funding remained at historically low levels and that revenues con-
tinued to grow as a share of the economy after the end of the
as Bad as You Thought, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.american
progress.org/issues/budget/news/2013/03/11/56048/the-united-states-long-term-debt-problem-
isnt-as-bad-as-you-thought/ [http://perma.cc/UW8M-34G7].
227. See generally CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 75-91. Whereas the
previous year, the alternative fiscal scenario was prominently displayed on the cover of the
report and throughout, see CBO, 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, depic-
tions of the alternative fiscal scenario in the new report were largely isolated to one chapter
of the report titled “The Economic and Budgetary Effects of Alternative Budget Policies,” see
CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 75-91.
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decade. It reported the seventy-five-year fiscal shortfall as equal to
1.7 percent of GDP—far short of the 8.7 percent of GDP it had
previously highlighted.228 The change in emphasis was done with
relatively little explanation,229 but it represented a needed correc-
tion after years of emphasizing a scenario that simply was not
particularly meaningful and had a significant effect on the public
discourse. The new trajectory could be more justifiable as represent-
ing policy uncertainty—uncertainty with regard to how to resolve
the fiscal shortfall and to which policymakers have some immediate
power to address. And the correction may not have been necessary
if CBO had rigorously considered the concepts underlying its report
in the years before.
The bottom line is this: first, just because we are uncertain about
how we will resolve our fiscal dilemma does not mean that we do
not expect to do so. Second, fundamental confusion about the under-
lying goal of these projections has sometimes considerably exagger-
ated the degree of uncertainty. The consequences have been real,
and have generated faulty information for policymakers. For exam-
ple, this puts long-term deficits higher on the agenda than they
should have been, because if policymakers did not pay much atten-
tion to the area now, the fiscal course would probably not have been
as bad as it appeared in these projections. This faulty information
also attributes a fiscal course to policymakers that is not reflective
of what they have done. And it further suggests that more radical
action is necessary than is actually the case to resolve the uncer-
tainty.
2. Confusion Compounds: The Curious Case of Generational
Accounting
It is important to emphasize the degree to which policymakers,
analysts, and academics alike are confused about long-term base-
lines—often in ways that exaggerate, or at least misstate, our fiscal
dilemma. The curious case of “generational accounting” illustrates
this in another way. A group of thoughtful and leading public fi-
228. CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 15, at 117 tbl.B-1; CBO, 2012
LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 11, at 21 tbl.1-3.
229. See supra note 17.
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nance scholars—Alan Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence
Kotlikoff—some twenty years ago introduced generational account-
ing as a way to gauge the effects of fiscal policy across gen-
erations.230 Although it has not been widely adopted, there has been
a recent push to formalize this method as part of the budget
process, including new legislation introduced in both houses,231 a
lobbying campaign by major deficit hawk organizations,232 and
signed support by seventeen winners of the Nobel Prize in Econom-
ics.233 Yet, this method represents an innovation in confusion. It
exaggerates our long-term fiscal challenge by confusing two very
different types of baselines: expectations baselines and uncertainty
baselines. This results in incoherent fiscal measures that show
future generations facing much higher tax burdens than they likely
will. Generational accounting should not become an official budget
metric and independent analysts should not employ it—at least
using the current methodology.
To be clear, generational accounting is a potentially helpful
device as a theoretical matter. It is a method for estimating the
relative net tax burdens that different generations of taxpayers will
230. See generally Auerbach et al., Generational Accounting, supra note 52.
231. Intergenerational Financial Obligations Reform Act, H.R. 2967, 113th Cong. (2013);
Intergenerational Financial Obligations Reform Act, S. 1351, 113th Cong. (2013). In addition
to requiring generational accounting, the INFORM Act also requires OMB and CBO to
calculate the “fiscal gap.” See Intergenerational Financial Obligations Reform Act, H.R. 2967,
113th Cong. (2013). By contrast to generational accounting (as applied), this metric is a much
more valid way of accounting for the long-term budget outlook. See infra note 236 and
accompanying text. In fact, both CBO and OMB already annually report the seventy-five-
year fiscal position in terms of the fiscal gap. See CBO, 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK,
supra note 15, at 117 tbl.B-1 (showing fiscal gap); OMB, FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 33,
at 26 tbl.3-2 (also showing fiscal gap).
232. See, e.g., Steve Bell, Economic Policy Project Statement on the INFORM Act,
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER (July 31, 2013), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/economic-policy-
project-statement-inform-act [http://perma.cc/NCH7-7XZP]; New Life for Generational Ac-
counting, COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET: THE BOTTOM LINIE (July 24, 2013), http://
crfb.org/blogs/new-life-generational-accounting [http://perma.cc/UW8K-THFH]; Concord Co-
alition Praises Plan to Focus More Attention on Intergenerational Fairness, Long-Term Im-
pact of Budget Decisions, CONCORD COALITION (July 24, 2013), http://concordcoalition.org/
press-releases/2013/0724/concord-coalition-praises-plan-focus-more-attention-
intergenerational-fairn [http://perma.cc/5Q49-LJVZ]; Maya MacGuinness, Statement from
the Campaign to Fix the Debt, FIX THE DEBT (July 24, 2013), http://www.fixthedebt.org/
uploads/files/INFORM%20Act%20Statement%207.24.13.pdf [http://perma.cc/262Z-TC9C].
233. Nobel Laureate Supporters of the Inform Act, http://www.theinformact.org/nobel-
laureate/supporters [http://perma.cc/5WT9-JQH9] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
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face on our current fiscal course.234 By projecting the net tax burden
(taxes paid less transfers received), it estimates the fiscal course in
terms that could be quite useful as a normative matter. This ac-
counting can, for instance, show how much, as a share of income,
each generation must pay to the government. There is some
question as to what is the fair pattern of such tax rates, but the
point is that this seems relevant to our assessment of whether we
are on a good course or not.
Generational accounting, however, is coherent only if it uses an
expectations baseline. The basis of the accounting system is the
idea that the government will stay within its budget constraint,
with it then answering how it will distribute the burden of doing
so.235 So, unlike many other long-term fiscal metrics (including the
fiscal gap measure discussed before, also introduced by Auer-
bach),236 this baseline is not a measure of the degree of uncertainty
involved in how the federal government’s budget constraint will be
met. Rather, it evaluates how our meeting that long-term budget
constraint affects different generations.
But generational accounting as normally operationalized—and as
it would be operationalized if adopted officially—uses an incoherent
baseline. It essentially follows something akin to the policy uncer-
234. See generally Auerbach et al., Generational Accounting, supra note 52.
235. See id. at 75-76.
236. See generally Auerbach, U.S. Fiscal Problem, supra note 52. As I have described, the
fiscal gap measures the necessary immediate adjustment in spending and taxes to hold the
debt-to-GDP ratio constant over a given period. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying
text. In contrast to generational accounting, the fiscal gap is consistent with an uncertainty
baseline. The metric can be understood as capturing the degree of uncertainty as to how
policymakers would achieve this fiscal target (stable debt-to-GDP ratio) over certain periods
of time. Unlike generational accounting, the fiscal gap does not confuse the expectations
baseline with the uncertainty baseline. This measurement has been more widely adopted
than generational accounting, as it should be.
Some may respond that the two concepts are not so different after all, and both employ
different assumptions about how the fiscal shortfall will eventually be closed. In particular,
the fiscal gap metric essentially assumes that the same amount of fiscal consolidation occurs
each and every year as a share of the economy, whereas generational accounting assumes
fiscal consolidation falls only on unborn generations. Neither is likely to be the actual
outcome. However, this undersells the fiscal gap measure and oversells generational
accounting. The fiscal gap can be conceptualized as a measure of average annual consoli-
dation required, the timing and composition of which is uncertain. This is a helpful way of
quantifying the degree of uncertainty in future fiscal consolidation. Generational accounting,
by contrast, does not provide that kind of information about uncertainty and instead seems
only to present a particular budget scenario that no one expects to occur.
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tainty baseline for all living generations (assuming these genera-
tions pay relatively little in taxes relative to the benefits they
receive), and then presumes that as yet unborn generations (or
sometimes unborn generations plus those currently children) will
completely pay off the full, resulting fiscal burden. This implies that
we will run large deficits up front, to be entirely bailed out in the
future. The result is not surprising, with unborn generations paying
much higher tax rates than any living generation, raising rather
large concerns about the equity of our fiscal policies. And yet it is a
scenario that almost certainly will not occur. Current generations
can expect to pay higher net taxes than the policy uncertainty base-
line suggests.
To put this differently, it would make just as much sense to
assume that the entire burden of the long-term fiscal shortfall falls
on living generations as it does to assume that it falls on those not
yet living. In that case, the future generations would appear to
make out rather well. That, too, is not what we expect to occur, and
yet, the logic is basically indistinguishable from that driving the
analysis in generational accounting as now done, which simply
posits that the burden will fall entirely on those not yet born.
Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Gokhale have offered responses to a
similar critique,237 but their defense still suggests a misunderstand-
ing of the kind of baseline that generational accounting requires in
order to be coherent. Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Gokhale suggest that
“in asking what would happen if policy were not to change, we are
illustrating the inevitability of such policy changes, and offering an
analytical framework within which the fiscal policy implications
and intergenerational impacts of any changes can be examined.”238
This response nicely defends metrics gauging what I call the uncer-
tainty baseline, trying to measure the size of the inevitable fiscal
adjustments and their effects. But it does not justify mixing an
237. In one of the early evaluations of generational accounting, economist Robert
Haveman noted that the apparent generational imbalance in fiscal burdens was largely the
result of assuming that unborn generations rather than living ones faced all fiscal consoli-
dation. See Robert Haveman, Should Generational Accounts Replace Public Budgets and
Deficits, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 100 (1994). While certainly similar to my own objection,
Haveman did not focus on the role of (and confusion around) baselines in generational
accounting, which I think goes to the core of the problem.
238. Auerbach et al., Generational Accounting, supra note 52, at 88.
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uncertainty baseline with an expectations baseline and creating a
scenario—unborn generations facing all fiscal consolidation (or my
hypothetical alternative of current generations bearing all of the
burden)—that neither reflects what we expect to occur nor the
degree of uncertainty as to how to achieve fiscal balance.
In short, while the basic idea of generational accounting is valid,
it has gone astray in application, as its users have employed an
uncertainty baseline for living generations in which an expectations
baseline is needed. This error has produced measures of net taxes
for different generations that are largely meaningless and certainly
overstate the degree to which unborn generations will pay more
than living ones under any reasonable projection of the current
budget.
And, just like CBO’s now abandoned “alternative fiscal scenario”
projections, generational accounting—if more widely adopted—
could misinform the national debate. Among other things, this could
lead to the long-term fiscal challenge getting more attention on the
national agenda than it deserves, and it could attribute an
intergenerationally unfair distribution of the fiscal burden to
current and past policymakers when that is neither expected nor
intended.
CONCLUSION
This Article will not end abuse and confusion surrounding budget
baselines. After all, baseline controversies are often featured in
heated and politicized budget fights, in which actors will try to
manipulate budget metrics to help achieve their desired outcomes.
Moreover, the concepts themselves can be deeply challenging. For
instance, it is difficult to define what it means to project and mea-
sure the degree to which budget deficits are unsustainable.
Still, despite these challenges, this Article has shown that
reducing the manipulation and allaying the confusion is possible.
Baselines are not inherently arbitrary or merely creatures of irra-
tional thought. Instead, they have important and constructive pur-
poses for which some baselines are better than others. Moreover,
the official budget baseline can be improved to reduce gamesman-
ship and improve political accountability, among other things.
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In sum, this Article provides a framework for understanding
what we are doing when we look into the future and ask what
course the budget laws are on. It provides a framework for defining
our fiscal future.
